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High levels of unemployment, or high levels of social expenditures as well as the growing demand 
for a flexible labour force have given new impetus to the world-wide discussion on what model to 
use for an efficiently operating labour market and in particular on the role of institutions. Although 
there seems to be a growing consensus on the restricted governmental role in recent decades, this  
has not been translated into a unanimous appraisal of the role of intermediary organisations, such as 
trade unions. There is no clear view on an appropriate distribution of responsibility between 
government, social partners and the market. The research project ‘distribution of responsibility for 
social security’ aims to create a scientific basis for a clear and consistent view on the role and 
distribution of responsibilities between the different labour market institutions. As part of this 
research project, this paper provides an elaborate country study of the Netherlands, on the 
organisation of unemployment insurance, employment protection and active labour market and the 
performance of the labour market with respect to these fields. Both first-order effects (e.g. coverage 
rates, expenditures, replacement rates) and second-order effects (e.g. flows in and out of 
unemployment insurance) are analysed in this paper.  
 
It is shown that national legislation for social insurance is set by the national government. The 
intermediary organisations, among which are the trade unions, mainly have an advisory role with 
respect to national legislation. The advice, however is not binding. Yet, national law leaves some 
room for sector level legislation, in collective labour agreements. Here, the trade unions do play an 
important role and it depends on their collective bargaining power what kind of provisions are 
established in collective labour agreements. The administration of social insurance is also left to 
public institutions. In the past decades, the role of the trade unions has been reduced drastically in 
this field. On the market for reintegration of the unemployed, some competition is introduced with 
the outsourcing of activities to private reintegration companies. As for the performance of the 
Dutch labour market, this is characterised by relatively high levels of employment, job security, 
income security during unemployment spells and growing activation policies. 
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 Distribution of responsibility for social security: The Netherlands 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“For the first time in a long time, the big issues in economic policy are about the labour market […]. Labour 
economics and the institutions and rules that govern labour markets have moved from the periphery to the 




In the last decades, the relation between labour market institutions and labour market performance 
has become the centre of both academic and policy debates in many OECD countries. High levels of 
unemployment, or high levels of social expenditures as well as the growing demand for a flexible 
labour force have given new impetus to the discussion on what model to use for an efficiently 
operating labour market. Generally two contrasting views are put forward in the discussion. Some 
argue that labour market institutions can help to find efficient solutions to economic problems, by 
overcoming the market failures (Coase, 1992). Yet, others argue that institutions too exhibit failures 
and lead to extra constraints on the labour market, hindering economic efficiency (North, 1991).  
 
In the Netherlands too, the social and political discussion on the socio-economic order has 
concentrated on the role of institutions on the labour market. As in the international debate, one of 
the main questions centres around the role of the government on the labour market. Whereas the 
government operates along vertical, hierarchical lines and uses commands and prohibitions, though 
sometimes also tax deductions, subsidies and other financial incentives, the market works through 
horizontal contractual relations that are, in principle, entered into voluntarily, and relies on 
individual cost/benefit calculations and the price mechanism. It is generally believed that the 
government works opposite to the market and that governmental influence and the public sector 
have grown too big, squeezing out the market. To restore the balance, the role of the government 
should be restricted and that of the market enhanced.  
 
Other labour market institutions too affect the working of the labour market, such as trade unions, 
works councils and employer organisations. These can be characterised as intermediary 
organisations. They are generally established voluntary and operate on the basis of the mutual 
interests of their members. In the view sketched above, in which the government should retreat in 
favour of the market, it is not evident what role these intermediary organisations should play. Again 
the two contending views exist, the first being that intermediary organisations form as much an 
impediment to the market mechanism as the government, and that their role should therefore also 
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be curtailed as much as possible. Trade unions and employers’ organisations are perceived to 
constitute a cartel on the labour market, obstructing free, market-driven wage-setting and flexibility. 
Involving the social partners in providing social security would promote the abuse of these 
arrangements to pursue particular (group) interests at the expense of the community. By contrast, 
the second view assigns an important role to the intermediary organisations in resolving 
coordination problems that cannot be adequately tackled by either the government or the market. 
They could constitute an efficient mechanism to reconcile conflicting interests of different social 
groups, or provide the means to highlight the concerns and interests of weaker market actors. In 
fact, the government’s retreat can in part be achieved by actually transferring certain responsibilities 
to intermediary organisations.  
 
The growing consensus on the restricted governmental role in recent decades has not been 
translated into a unanimous appraisal of the role of intermediary organisations. There is no clear 
view on an appropriate distribution of responsibility between government, social partners and the 
market (de Beer, 2005a). In the Netherlands, this difference in opinion is expressed, for instance, in 
the widely divergent appreciation of the so-called ‘polder model’, the typical Dutch consultative 
structure for government and social partners.  
 
This research project ‘distribution of responsibility for social security’ aims to create a scientific 
basis for a clear and consistent view on the role and distribution of responsibilities between the 
different labour market institutions. Elaborate country studies in five countries with differences in 
the role of the intermediary organisations (viz. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom) are performed and are the input for a comparative research on the 
consequences of these institutional differences for the performance of the labour market. The focus 
is on unemployment insurance, employment protection, active labour market policy and their 
interrelation. The underlying paper presents the country study for the Netherlands. Before turning 
to the outline of the report, first a short overview is given of three key issues in current debates on 
the labour market (e.g., flexibility, social security and active labour market policy) and the role of the 
main institutions (e.g., government, trade unions, employers) in the Netherlands. Details, however, 
are provided in subsequent sections of this report. 
 
1.2 FLEXIBILITY, SOCIAL SECURITY AND ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
Flexibility, social security (or flexicurity) and active labour market policy are three key concepts in 
current debates on the labour market. In short, flexibility refers to the possibilities for both 
employers and workers to adapt their labour market behaviour to their individual needs or to 
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changes in the economic environment. Social security provides income protection for workers who 
are (temporarily) out of a job and active labour market policies facilitate their reintegration into the 
labour market. As part of the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ such a system could lead to an efficiently 
operating labour market, with Denmark often used as an example with high flexibility, generous 
social security and strong activation policies (Bredgaard et al., 2005; Wilthagen & Tros, 2005). In 
many countries, such as the Netherlands, measures are now taken to achieve a ‘Golden Triangle’. 
How does the Dutch labour market currently looks like in this respect? 
 
In some respects, the Dutch labour market is characterised as a flexible labour market, especially 
when it comes to working time flexibility. Part-time work is common, albeit more for women than 
for men and jobs with flexibility in determining when to work (contrary to the usual nine to five) are 
growing. In addition, flexible work arrangements such as temporary contracts or working through 
temporary work agencies are large in the Netherlands. Contrary to this, numerical flexibility is 
relatively low in the Dutch labour market. Numerical flexibility refers to the possibilities to quickly 
adapt the workforce to economic changes through hiring and firing (Bredgaard et al., 2005). 
Employment protection legislation for workers on permanent or standard contracts is relatively 
strong in the Netherlands (e.g., Tregaskis and Brewster, 2006; Deelen et al., 2006). National 
legislation still depends on rules set out during the second World War and collective labour 
agreements accomplished by the social partners on the sector or company level sometimes provide 
even stronger, yet in some cases less strong employment protection rules. Employers are not free 
to dismiss their workers, i.e. they formally need the consent of either a public employment service 
or from the court. In both cases the dismissal involves either a lot of time or high costs.  
 
Social security is well-developed in the Netherlands. In terms of the characterisation of welfare 
states by Esping-Andersen (1990), the Dutch system is a hybrid case, having social-democratic, 
corporatist and even liberal features (Goodin et al., 1999). The basic welfare system is social-
democratic, with universal, partly tax-funded, benefits on relatively high levels to prevent all 
residents from falling into poverty. Entitlement conditions are relatively easy to meet, although these 
have recently been tightened for most social insurances. In addition, corporatist features include a 
strong link to employment history for unemployment benefits and relatively strong employment 
protection for workers with long service. Finally, some liberal elements have entered the welfare 
state, with more free choice in health insurance and in the reintegration market, where clients can 
choose between reintegration companies.  
 
Active labour market policies are aimed at two objectives: keeping the insiders in and getting the 
outsiders in. In both cases this is established by encouraging investments in human capital (e.g., 
training vocational and social skills) at different stages of the life cycle, to enhance employability 
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throughout the worker’s lifetime. Responsibility for maintaining the employment relation and the 
employability of the worker is a responsibility shared by employers and workers (Kluytmans & Ott, 
1999).  Employers have to be willing and able to offer permanent training for workers and create a 
working environment in which the worker has full potential to develop and the worker has to be 
willing to enrol in training programmes and invest in his own human capital.  
 
Recently, criticism on these provisions and their relation has grown. The strict employment 
protection legislation for permanent contracts is perceived to reduce the (permanent) job 
opportunities for ‘outsiders’ or newcomers on the labour market (e.g., women), which might have a 
negative impact on employment growth (Deelen et al., 2006). Accordingly, relaxation of Dutch 
employment protection has been proposed, both by the most important advisory institutions and by 
the political parties in light of the latest elections (November, 2006). Yet, in a European context, the 
Dutch system is named as being a good example of ensuring “that labour markets are made more 
flexible by diversifying the types of contracts in order to meet the needs of workers and firms, while 
providing workers with appropriate levels of security (employment protection and the capacity to 
remain in work)” (European Employment Task Force, 2003). Criticism on unemployment benefits 
too has grown. The levels is perceived to be too high and duration too long discouraging workers to 
find a new job. In combination with the relatively strict employment protection legislation, it reduces 
flows in and out of unemployment (Deelen et al., 2006). Recently, changes have been made to the 
system of unemployment insurance mainly to prevent the inflow and to increase the outflow. In 
addition, active labour market policy has been liberalised a little with the outsourcing of 
reintegration activities to private companies. The public institutions, however, still remain 
responsible for the reintegration of unemployed workers. 
 
It is difficult to change the system, because of the interrelations between the three concepts. When 
employment protection is reduced, employers can more easily fire workers and hire others, which 
might lead to better employer-worker matches in the end and more efficient production (MacLeod, 
2005). When unemployment benefits are not reduced at the same time, or their duration not 
shortened, people might stay too long on unemployment benefits, which has negative consequences 
for their human capital and their future career possibilities (Pissarides, 1992). When employment 
protection is lowered and unemployment benefits are reduced but active labour market policies are 
not strengthened at the same time, this might have negative consequences for the living standard of 
the Dutch population. It is a matter of fine-tuning the key buttons on the instrument board of the 
labour market.  
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1.3 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The fine-tuning in the level of these provisions is, however, only part of the story. Another issue is 
who, or what institution, is responsible for the provision and at what level these are supplied. Who 
determines employment protection rules and what institutions monitor the implementation? Who is 
in charge of determining the conditions or the implementation of unemployment insurance? What 
institutions are involved in the reintegration of unemployed workers into the labour market? Are 
these activities to be organised at a national level or a local or sector level? The responsible 
institution might be the employer, the (local or central) government, the trade unions or a private 
company. This largely depends on the organisation of labour market policy in a country.  
 
In the Netherlands, the so-called ‘poldermodel’ or ‘consensus model’ mainly governs labour market 
policy (Visser & Hemerijk, 1997). One of the main characteristics of the model is that employers’ 
associations, trade unions (together often denoted as the social partners) and government are 
organised in bipartite or tripartite bodies, such as the Foundation of Labour (STAR, see Box 1.1) and 
the Social and Economic Council (SER, see Box 1.1). In general, the government determines the 
rules, whereby the advise received from the social partners is taken very seriously. The probability 
of adoption by the government is largest when an advice in the SER is unanimously achieved, which 
is the case in over eighty percent of the advices (SER, 2006a). In addition, the social partners used to 
have a relatively large role in the administration of social security, but after some critical reports on 
the inefficiency of labour bureaus (which were partly governed by the social partners), the large 
inflow in disability insurance and doubts about the representativeness of the trade unions (e.g., low 
union density and mainly targeted at the interest of the ‘insiders’), their role was largely reduced 
with the reform of the social security administration in 2002 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1992).1
 
Apart from their advisory role in national labour market policy, another main activity of Dutch trade 
unions is the accomplishment of collective labour agreements (CLA’s), through collective bargaining. 
National labour law is, for the majority of issues at least, only ‘75 percent binding’ (3/4 dwingend 
recht), which means that deviations from the national legislation are allowed in collective labour 
agreements. This leaves an important role for trade unions in actual labour law provisions. Legally, 
CLA’s are regulated in the Collective Labour Agreements Act (Wet CAO, 1927) and can be 
accomplished by one ore more employers or employers’ organisations and one or more trade 
unions.  When an employer who is a member of an employers’ organisation accomplishes a CLA, 
this agreement is binding for all his workers, regardless whether these are trade union members.   
                                                  
1 More information on this is to follow from a ongoing research on the changes in the distribution of responsibilities for social 
security in the Netherlands in recent history (research also funded by Stichting Instituut GAK and conducted by AIAS under 
supervision of Paul de Beer). 
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Box 1.1: The STAR and the SER. 
The Foundation of Labour (STAR), a civil-law institution established in 1945,  is a bipartite consultative 
institution in which central employers’ associations and trade unions, i.e. the social partners, are represented. 
The represented employers’ organisations are: the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and employers 
(VNO-NCW, the most important employers’ organisation) with four seats, the Association of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (MKB-Nederland) with two seats and the Dutch Organisation for Agriculture and 
Horticulture (LTO-Nederland) with two seats. The represented trade unions are: the Federation of 
Netherlands Trade Unions (FNV, consisting of sixteen unions) with four seats, the National Federation of 
Christian Trade Unions in the Netherlands (CNV) with two seats and the Federation of managerial and 
professional staff unions (MHP) with two seats. Discussions centre around labour issues such as wage 
moderation, social security and pensions, education and training, personnel policy and part-time or flexible 
employment. Its goals are to stimulate negotiations between employers and workers and their organisations, 
inform and advice trade unions and employers’ associations. Twice a year, in the spring and in the fall, a meeting 
with the government is held and central issues are discussed. The majority of agreements reached in the STAR 
are recommendations at the sector or company level. Several illustrious national level agreements have been 
reached in the STAR, such as the ‘Wassenaar Akkoord’ (1982) on wage moderation and reduction of working 
hours, the ‘Nieuwe Koers Akkoord’ (1993) on wage moderation and sector-specific measures to combat 
unemployment, the ‘Flex Akkoord’ (1996) on flexible work and protection of flexible workers, and the 
‘NajaarsAkkoord’ (2003) on reduction of the wage increases to zero. This latter agreement, however, has been 
removed in 2004,  when the negotiations on early retirement schemes got stranded. Yet, after a huge 
demonstration in Amsterdam, consensus was reached on the early retirement age, changes in disability 
insurance and unemployment insurance and wage agreements in the ‘Museumpleinakkoord’ (2004). 
 
The Social and Economic Council (SER), a public institution established in 1950 by law, is a tripartite 
advisory body. It has three main objectives: balanced economic growth, high labour participation and a 
reasonably fair income distribution. The main task is to advice the government on these issues. For the 
employers’ associations and trade unions, the distribution of seats in the SER depends on the size of the 
organisations. The represented employers’ organisations are (as in the STAR) VNO-NCW with seven seats, 
MKB-Nederland with three seats and LTO-Nederland with one seat. The represented trade unions are FNV 
with eight seats, CNV with two seats and MHP with one seat. Besides these employers’ organisations and trade 
unions, so-called ‘crown members’, to represent the government. These crown members are usually professors 
in the field of economics, financial sciences, law or social sciences, and usually involve representatives of the 
Dutch Central Bank and the Central Planning Bureau. Although they are appointed by the government, they do 
not have to give account to the government. 
 
In addition, the negotiating partners can request the Ministry of Social Affairs for a legal extension of 
the coverage of the CLA to all workers in the concerning sector, including those working with 
employers who are not a member of any employers’ organisation, which is regulated by Act (Wet 
AVV, 1936). According to the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), this legal 
extension increases the coverage rate of CLA’s with about five percent, while the SER argues that 
this increases is slightly over ten percent (CPB, 2005; SER, 2006b). As a result, while trade union 
density is only about 25 percent in the Netherlands, the coverage of collective bargaining is about 85 
percent (SER, 2006a). A final point to mention here is that for CLA’s to come into force, notification 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs is needed. According to the Wage Formation Act of 1970, no CLA 
can be enforced without this notification (van Hoek, 2002).  
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There are two types of CLA’s : the sector agreement and the company agreement.  Sector 
agreements are accomplished by negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations 
and they apply to a specific sector of the economy. They apply to about 86 percent of the 
employees under a CLA (SER, 2006b). Company agreements are accomplished by negotiations 
between trade unions and specific employers.  In the CLA’s, apart from provisions on salary, 
working hours, care arrangements etc, additional regulations can be included on employment 
protection, unemployment insurance or even reintegration activities. These might be a substitute or 
a complement to national legislation. Collective labour agreements are important in the Dutch 
labour market since they determine actual labour market policy and are typical for the industrial 
relations in the Netherlands. 
 
Apart from the role of the government and social partners in the determination of national and 
sector legislation, other institutions are involved in the implementation of employment protection, 
unemployment insurance and active labour market policy. In the field of employment protection, the 
main actors are employers, the civil court and the Centre for Work and Income (CWI).  In the field 
of unemployment insurance, the main actors are the CWI again, the Social Security Agency (UWV) 
and the municipalities with administrative power, the Council for Work and Income (RWI) with an 
advisory role and the Inspection for Work and Income (IWI) with a monitoring role. Finally, with 
respect to reintegration policy, apart from the same institutions as those involved in unemployment 
insurance, private reintegration companies are involved. The exact role of these institutions is 
discussed in the specific sections of this paper.  
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
 
This report gives a detailed overview of the Dutch system of employment protection, 
unemployment insurance and active labour market policy. Section 2 describes the system of 
employment protection in the Netherlands, section 3 describes the system of unemployment 
insurance and section 4 describes active labour market policy. Each section includes a brief 
description of the recent development of the particular institution (i.e., since the 1990s) and the 
main elements of the system (i.e., regulations and practice) including industrial relations and the role 
of collective bargaining. Particular attention is paid to the distribution of responsibilities: what is the 
role of the central and local government, the social partners and of private actors? In addition, the 
first order effects are discussed, e.g. coverage rate, average notice period, average severance pay, 
average procedural time, replacement rates, social expenditures, reintegration rates.  
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Second, section 5 analyses the performance of the overall system. How does the formal relation 
between the three types of institutions as discussed earlier works in practice? What are the second 
order effects, e.g. employment and unemployment rates, hiring and firing rates for different groups 
of workers, structural unemployment rates, flows between employment and unemployment 
(including average duration of unemployment spells), costs and benefits of social insurance and active 
labour market policy, cleavage between insiders and outsiders, income inequality between the 
unemployed, social assistance recipients and the employed. Both the description of the systems and 
the performance indicators are illustrative for the Dutch system and are the input for the 
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2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION  
 
2.1 NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
 
Dutch employment legislation was first established in 1907 with the Employment Contracts Act 
(Wet op de Arbeidsovereenkomst) in which, among other things, a notice period was established to 
protect workers against instantaneous dismissal. Recently the discussion about employment 
protection legislation has been given new impetus in the Netherlands, both with the awaited advice 
on this subject from the SER and the publication of the political standpoints on employment 
protection in light of the elections of November, 2006. In the past years, several discussions 
between the trade unions, employers and the government were held, but never an agreement has 
been reached about reshaping the Dutch system of employment protection. In 2000, an advisory 
committee was established to evaluate the system and their conclusion was that it is not 
transparent, not in line with the systems in other EU countries and that the state has a relatively 
large role in, what should be according to them, private law issues such as the dismissal of workers 
(Adviescomité Duaal Ontslagstelsel, 2000). Employers further argue that the high costs of dismissals 
have a negative impact on the economy (e.g., on productivity and economic growth) because the 
company’s workforce cannot be quickly adapted to changing circumstances at the market. Right-
wing or liberal political parties therefore want to relax or reduce employment protection. The trade 
unions and left-wing parties, on the other side, argue that a fair ‘justification test’ of dismissals and a 
reasonable severance pay need to protect workers against unreasonable dismissal. Moreover, they 
argue that state intervention is necessary to protect weaker groups of workers (STAR, 2003). 
 
The system of employment protection might, however, be simplified, as the Dutch system is 
characterised by dualism as is explained shortly. Although the final advice of the SER on this subject 
is delayed until the end of 2006, some changes have already been made recently to the Dutch 
system of employment protection. An overview of recent changes is shown in Table 2.1 and 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Table 2.1: Changes in the Dutch system of employment protection, 1990-2006. 
Date  Change made to the system 
January, 1999  Law Flexibility and Security: limitation of the number and total duration of a sequence of 
temporary contracts to protect temporary and flexible workers. 
March, 2006  Seniority principle no longer needs to be the dominant principle when selecting workers in 
the case of collective dismissal. The mirror image or reflection principle should be the first 
selection criterion. 
March, 2006  Trade union rather than the Public Employment Service judges the economic conditions for 
collective dismissal.  
       Source:  CWI  (2006a). 
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The main employment protection regulations, i.e. any laws regarding the termination of the 
employment relation between the employer and the worker are to be found in the Civil Code 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek), in the Special Decree on Employment Relationships (Buitengewoon Besluit 
Arbeidsverhoudingen, 1945), in the Works Councils Act (Wet op de ondernemingsraden, 1971), in 
collective labour agreements and in individual labour contracts. The main institutions involved in 
employment protection are employers, the court, a public employment service, the government and 
the social partners. Their role and responsibilities in dismissal procedures is explained below.  
In general, individual labour contracts can end in several ways (see Table 2.2): The contract ends 
legally; the contract ends by mutual consent; the worker is fired on the spot; the worker is fired 
during his trial period; the contract is dissolved by the court; or terminated by the CWI. An 
important distinction has to be made between regular (or permanent) contracts and temporary 
contracts.  
 
Table 2.2: Ways in which labour contracts have been terminated
a, 1997-1999. 
  Number of terminations 
  Absolute  Relative 
Legally 
By mutual consent 
Fired on the spot 
During probation time 
Dissolved by court 

















Total 1,010,000   
aThis only concerns contracts that are terminated on the employer’s initiative.
 bIn the Graphic Industry and Special 
Education separate dismissal procedures existed during this period, see Van Zevenbergen & Oelen (2000) for details 
on this.  
Source: Van Zevenbergen & Oelen (2000) 
 
2.1.1 WORKERS ON TEMPORARY CONTRACTS 
 
Table 2.2 shows that the majority of contracts that end, end legally, because they are of a temporary 
nature. In the case of temporary contracts, i.e. with a given duration, the worker knows when his 
contract is going to end. Labour law does, however, provide some regulations concerning the 
validity of the termination of temporary contracts. The Flexibility and Security Act dating from 
January, 1999 (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid, based on an agreement between workers and employers 
dating from April 3, 1996) has been established to enlarge the possibilities for flexible contracts but 
at the same time protect the workers on such contracts. One of the main regulations within this law 
concerns the limitation of the number and total duration of a sequence of temporary contracts. 
Crucial here is the interval period in between the temporary contracts: only contracts that follow 
each other within a period of three months are counted as sequential contracts. Law states that 
either a fourth sequential temporary contracts or the running contract after a sequence of 
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temporary contracts with a total duration of more than 36 months is automatically transformed into 
a permanent contract. For example, it is possible to have three sequential contracts of a year. For a 
fourth contract to be a temporary contract, the break after the third contract needs to be more 
than three months, otherwise it is transformed into a permanent contract. There is no notice 
period for the termination of temporary contracts (since the end date is specified in the contract). 
All these provisions, however, might be differently arranged in collective labour agreements, as 
shown in section 2.2.  
 
In most cases, the employer notifies the temporary worker whether he wants to renew the 
contract or not. If he does not specify this, the contract is silently renewed for the same duration as 
the previous contract. In case it would be the fourth renewal, the contract is transferred into a 
permanent contract. In practice this might cause problems and the best thing for employers is to 
clearly state whether the contract is going to be renewed or not. 
 










1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
temporary, perspective to become permanent temporary, all
 
Source: OSA (2004, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of workers on temporary contracts over the past decades. As de 
Beer (2005b) already argued, the pattern very much follows the economic business cycle. When the 
economy starts growing, employers first attract workers on temporary contracts. These workers 
are offered permanent contracts only when the economy remains growing. This is supported by the 
growth in the number of temporary contracts with a perspective to become permanent in recent 
years, when economic prospects are improving again. In downward periods, workers on temporary 
contracts are the first to be dismissed (or contract is not renewed).  
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2.1.2 WORKERS ON REGULAR CONTRACTS 
 
Both the worker and the employer can be the initiator for the termination of regular or permanent 
contracts. When the worker takes the initiative for termination of the contract, i.e. he resigns from 
the job, he has a minimum notice period of one month (Article 672.3 of Civil Code). Collective 
labour agreements or individual labour contracts might state a longer notice period, provided that 
the notice period for the employer is not shorter than that of the worker, this to stress the higher 
protection of the worker. No further legal requirements have to be met, but the advise is to give 
written notice to the employer with a reasonable reason for the resignation. When no reason is 
given, the employer might start a procedure against the worker for ‘unreasonable resignation’ and 
demand a compensation fee. The employer has a legal duty to investigate the proposed resignation 
of the worker.  Resigning from the job, however, might lead to non-entitlement to unemployment 
benefits, something which the worker should keep in mind. When he resigns, he usually does so in 
mutual consent with the employer. Finally, workers have the possibility to resign on the spot, yet 
very urgent reasons are needed for this (e.g., mental or physical abuse, sexual harassment, not being 
paid or compensated according to contract). If there is no such urgent reason, the employer might 
claim compensation pay. When resigning on the spot, no notice period applies.  
 
When the employer takes the initiative for termination of the contract, he too has to comply with a 
notice period (article 672.2 of Civil Code). The employer has a legal notice period depending on the 
duration of the labour contract (i.e. ranging from one month in case of a contract of less than five 
years to four months in case of a contract of at least fifteen years). This period might be differently 
arranged in the collective labour agreement (see section 2.2). A notice period is costly for an 
employer, for example, when his company is hit by a negative productivity shock and jobs become 
unprofitable, the existence of a notice period extends their duration (OECD, 2004). When a worker 
already starts searching for a new job during his notice period, this might reduce the duration of 
dependence on unemployment benefits. One might argue that with a notice period, the costs of 
unemployment are shifted from the collective (i.e. society as a whole) to the employer. The costs 
for society might be lower when the costs for the employer are below those of the payment of 
unemployment benefits and reintegration activities. More on the relation between employment 
protection and unemployment insurance in section 5. 
 
For dismissing a worker, there are several routes to follow. Most commonly is dismissal by mutual 
consent, following from Table 2.1. The worker and the employer together agree on the terms of 
contract termination that are reported in a so-called ‘termination agreement’. The terms include 
severance pay, the end date of the contract, the payment of non-claimed holiday days but might also 
include more detailed things such as help with finding another job, or the organisation of a farewell 
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reception. This termination agreement is often ratified by court, who dissolves the labour contract 
on neutral grounds, the so-called ‘pro forma’ cases. This procedure is mainly applied to safeguard 
the worker’s entitlement to unemployment benefits. After all, the worker looses his entitlement to 
unemployment benefits when he is blamefully dismissed. Research suggests that 67 to 80 percent of 
the dismissal cases that go to court are pro forma cases (van Zevenbergen & Oelen, 2000). Recently 
the SER has advised to relax the test for whether the worker is blamefully dismissed, which is 
expected to reduce the number of pro forma cases (SER, 2005). However, it might have unintended 
consequences for the number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries (see section 3). 
 
To terminate the labour contract ‘more formally’ the employer can choose between two routes. 
This unique dual system, which consist of a civil law route and a public route, was introduced first in 
1940, under the German occupation. It was meant to prevent mass unemployment and the 
corresponding increase in benefit claims. Over the years, several proposals have been made to 
abolish this regulation, based on the following arguments (Adviescommissie Duaal Ontslagstelsel, 
2000): (1) the legislation was adopted for a temporary extraordinary situation and no longer has a 
decent ground after the war; (2) it primarily concerns an individual interest for which reason civil 
law should apply; (3) the dual system is too complex and not transparent; (4) contracting role of the 
government with respect to employment protection in particular; (5) it makes integration in the 
European Union more difficult with respect to labour and social policy. Until now these arguments 
were not decisive and have not lead to a change of the system. One of the main reasons for the 
government to maintain the dual system is the protection of weaker social groups against socially 
unacceptable dismissal practice and to prevent high inflow into social security.  
 
First, a contract can be terminated by the CWI (see Box 2.1 for a description of this institute).2 
When applying for such a dismissal permit, the employer needs to provide the CWI with an 
elaborate report on the case with a thorough explanation of the reasons for dismissal. The CWI 
first looks whether all relevant information is provided, and the next step is the hearing of the 
worker. He or she is, in writing, asked for a response to the proposed dismissal. At this hearing, the 
worker can oppose to the proposed dismissal. Research shows that in the majority of cases (75 
percent), the worker only ‘formally objects’ to the dismissal, mainly to keep entitlement to 
unemployment benefits (van Zevenbergen & Oelen, 2000). If the dismissal permit is granted by the 
CWI, the worker still has legal grounds to contest its validity (in court). If the employer is granted a 
permit to dismiss there is no severance pay, but the earlier explained notice period still applies. This 
period is reduced with one month, because of the dismissal procedure, with a minimal notice period 
of one month remaining. If the dismissal permit is denied, the employer can still go to court.  
 
                                                  
2 Before 2002, the Regional Director Labour Supply (Public Employment Service) dealt with dismissal procedures.   
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Box 2.1: The CWI.  
The Centre for Work and Income (CWI) is an independent public body (ZBO). A ZBO is an institution 
which performs a public task independently of the government. The responsible Minister, in this case the Minister 
of Social Affairs and Employment, is not held responsible for the decisions made by the institution itself and has 
limited power. He can appoint members of the boards or (dis)approve the budget of the institution. The CWI is 
centrally governed, but operates on a decentralised level with 130 branch offices and about 4,500 employees. The 
objectives and tasks of CWI are determined by law and recorded in the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment and in the annual reports of the CWI (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2004). The main tasks of the 
CWI are: judgement dismissal claims, registration of the unemployed, determination of ‘type of unemployed’ and 
preparation of social security dossier, support unemployed in finding a job.  
 
 
The CWI procedure acts as a check on the fairness of the dismissal. It is financially less burdensome 
than the alternative but the procedure takes much longer, mainly because of the hearing of the 
worker. According to the CWI about eighty percent of the dismissal cases are handled within six 
weeks, as shown in Table 2.3. For dismissals that are not due to economic reasons (e.g., non-
functioning or disability of the worker), this percentage is lower due to the fact that a more in-depth 
research is usually needed. However, when employers are questioned on the duration of the CWI 
dismissal procedure, a different outcome is found.  Employers argue that only about ten percent of 
the dismissal procedures are handled within six weeks and that about thirty percent even takes 
longer than half a year (van Zevenbergen & Oelen, 2000).  This is mainly due to the preparation of 
the elaborate dossier for the dismissal giving the employer the idea that the full procedure takes 
much longer. In case the worker signs a ‘statement of no objection’, the so-called short procedure is 
applied in which case no hearing is held and the procedure takes about ten days. In 2005, only fifteen 
percent of the dismissals were of this latter type (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2006a).   
 
Table 2.3: Average procedural time for dismissals via CWI, 2005 (%). 
Reason for dismissal    Average duration 
Economic  Non-economic  Disability  Total 
< 2 weeks  28  6  9  22 
2 – 4 weeks  33  29  28  32 
4 – 6 weeks  20  26  14  19 
> 6 weeks  19  39  48  27 
Absolute total   50,167  4,373  15,614  70,154 
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs (2006a). 
 
Dutch labour law states that fair dismissals are those on ground of worker behaviour, unsuitability, 
or for economic reasons. The majority is because of economic reasons, either individual (e.g., the 
worker no longer matches the required working profile) or collective (e.g., reorganisation), as Table 
2.4 shows. The employer has to provide the CWI with data on the financial situation of the 
company and alternatives to the dismissal (e.g., another position within the firm including possible 
re-training). In case of a collective dismissal, the selection criteria (e.g., seniority principle) have to be 
specified as well. More on collective dismissals in section 2.1.3.  
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Table 2.4: Reasons for dismissal, 2005 (CWI procedures only). 
Reason for dismissal  Percentage of total dismissals at CWI 
Economic – individual 
Economic – collective 










  100 
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs (2006a) 
 
Dutch labour law also specifies some grounds on which dismissal is unfair or prohibited: pregnancy, 
membership of a works council, sickness or disability, sex, race, religion, membership of political 
party or union membership (article 670 of Civil Code). If the dismissal is not sufficiently founded on 
reasonable grounds the employer is denied a permit to dismiss. In 2005, 7 percent of the dismissal 
applications treated by the CWI was rejected (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2006a). In case of 
unreasonable dismissal, a compensation pay might be paid to the worker, of which the amount is 
governed by application of the regular severance pay formula (‘court rule’, see Box 2.2). The option 
of reinstatement is rarely made available to the worker. When the CWI rejects the dismissal, the 
employer can still decide to use the alternative route to dissolve the contract.  
 
Second, instead of turning to the CWI, the employer can file a request with the court to dissolve 
the employment contract. In most cases a severance pay is determined by the court. The amount 
(i.e. the number of monthly gross salaries) is calculated based on the earlier mentioned ‘court rule’ 
and depends on the worker’s age, the duration of his labour contract, his earnings and a correction 
factor (see Box 2.2 for the details of this formula). Research to actual severance payments in the 
Netherlands shows that in 83 percent of the dismissal cases a severance pay is being paid, varying 
from 488 to 363,000 euros. When the worker takes the initiative for the dismissal, the average 
severance pay is lower (about 9,740 euro) than when the employer takes the initiative (about 12,660 
euro) (Beltzer, 1999). In some cases, the severance pay is higher than what the employer expected 
and there is simply no ‘budget’ to dismiss the worker (van Zevenbergen & Oelen, 2000).  
 
When the court route is followed by the employer, the legal notice period does not apply, but the 
court can still decide on notice period, usually to a maximum of three weeks (Hassink et al., 1998). 
This could imply that the worker has an earlier entitlement to unemployment insurance compared 
to the CWI route. And he receives severance pay. To prevent this ‘double income’, the CWI applies 
a fictitious notice period. This means that entitlement to unemployment insurance only starts after a 
‘waiting period’ which his equal to the notice period the employer would have had when he 
followed the CWI route (UWV, 2006a). 
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Box 2.2: The court rule on severance pay. 










the weighted number of working years, with the following weights:  
       1    for every year worked until the age of forty; 
       1.5 for every year worked in between the age of forty and fifty  
       2    for every year worked in after the age of fifty 
The age is taken at the time of dissolution of the contract and working years are measured in full 
years.  
the worker’s last monthly gross earnings plus eight percent holiday money. Fixed age supplements 
such as a thirteenth month, an allowance for people working in shifts are added to this. 
a correction factor. Starting point is a correction factor of one, which is referred to as a neutral 
dissolution. When the court considers that the payment of a severance pay not in place, for 
example when the worker is to blame, a correction factor below one, even zero, is applied. When 
the courts considers that the employer is to blame for the dismissal, he might apply a correction 
factor above one.  
 
Although the court route is more expensive (because of the severance pay and court costs) it is 
shorter and administratively less burdensome. According to Deelen et al., (2006), the average 
duration of dismissal procedures via court is eleven days for pro-forma cases (about eighty percent 
of all court cases) and six to eight weeks for cases with objections. For the employer, the court 
route is even more attractive since the dismissal dossier for the court has to be less elaborate 
compared to the CWI route. In addition, because of the workload of most courts, in many cases no 
further hearing is held or inquiry is started on the details of the dismissal. As a consequence, the 
‘success rate’ is higher for the court route, compared to the CWI route. In 1998, only 3.5 percent 
of the dismissal cases by court are rejected (compared to about 7 percent via the CWI route, van 
Zevenbergen & Oelen (2000)). Although the court also looks at the reasons for the proposed 
dismissals and tests according to the same principles as the CWI, a different outcome is possible 
(see Box 2.3 for an example of this). For the opponents of the dual dismissal system in the 
Netherlands, this is one of the reasons to abolish the dualism. Although employers are reluctant to 
reveal the main reason for opting for the court route rather than the CWI route, the speed and the 
success rate of the procedure is an important reason (van Zevenbergen & Oelen, 2000).  
 
Box 2.3: The two dismissal procedures compared in one case.  
An employer wanted to dismiss thirty of his workers because of economic reasons. He started a procedure 
at the CWI, but a permit to dismiss was refused (reasons unknown). Subsequently, the employer started a 
procedure to dissolve the contracts via court. While this procedure was running, the CWI admitted to have 
made a mistake and was willing to re-evaluate the case. The employer accepted but continued to keep the 
court-procedure running. The judge had no problems with this and argued that “the two procedures are 
totally independent”. 
For 28 out of the 30 workers both the court and the CWI agreed with the dismissal. In two cases, 
however, the outcome was different. For person A, the court rejected the dissolution of the contract 
because it was not in accordance with the ‘last in, first out’ principle. The CWI, however, argued that this 
principle was applied correctly and gave permission to dismiss the contract. For person B, the reverse 
happened, with the court giving permission to dissolve the contract, but he CWI rejecting this permission 
because of non-accordance with the ‘last in, first out’ principle.  
Source: De Greef (2005) 
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During the 1990s the number of dismissals decreased from 140,000 to a minimum of about 80,000 
dismissals in total, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. During the next period, however, the number of 
dismissals doubled to about 160,000 in 2004. In the second half of the 1990s, the share of dismissals 
by court increased from one third to about a half of the total number of dismissals. These changes in 
dismissal rates are likely to follow the economic business cycle. Today, still about half the dismissal 
cases go to court, notwithstanding some small fluctuations in the intermediary years. Research 
suggests a relation between the worker’s age and the route followed by which the labour contract is 
terminated. When the worker is young, the court route is the most likely choice, because the 
severance pay, which is related to the worker’s age, is not likely to be high. When the worker is 
older, however, the severance pay is much higher and the CWI route is a more likely choice for the 
employer (van Zevenbergen & Oelen, 2000). In addition, large firms are more likely to use the court 
route compared to small or medium-sized firms, most probably because of the higher costs (Deelen 
et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 2.2: Number of dismissals via court and CWI (% of total number of dismissals), 1994-2005. 
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs (2006a) 
 
Workers on trial can be dismissed at any moment, without notice. Law states that trial periods are 
one month for contracts shorter than two years and two months for other contracts (article 652 of 
Civil Code. Deviations set explicitly in collective labour agreements are only allowed for contracts 
shorter than two years, a longer period is allowed, with a maximum of two months. Finally, the 
employer can fire the worker on the spot, for which urgent reasons are needed. No notice period 
applies when firing the worker on the spot, the contract is ended immediately. In addition, since the 
workers is usually blamefully dismissed, no entitlement to unemployment insurance exists.  
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2.1.3 COLLECTIVE DISMISSAL 
 
According to law collective dismissal refers to the dismissal of at least twenty workers because of 
economic reasons within three months in one working area of a county manager (‘districtsmanager’).  
In this situation, the employer has to follow certain rules. According to the ‘Reporting Collective 
Dismissal’ Act (Wet melding collectief ontslag), he has to report the proposed collective dismissal to 
the CWI. He also has to inform the works council and start negotiations with the trade unions 
concerned. The works councils play an important advisory role in the collective dismissal procedure. 
Their advice mainly concerns how to replace the workers within the firm, to the best needs of the 
company and the workers.3 The trade unions play a large role in the conditions under which they 
agree on the collective dismissal (e.g., benefits, retraining, career support), which are reported in a 
social plan. This is a collective arrangement covering the consequences for workers in case of 
termination, bankruptcy, take-over, shrinking or movement of the company at which they work. It 
serves as a minimum provision for the collectively dismissed workers. In most collective agreements 
a clause is included that makes the establishment of a social plan obligatory. The social plan is binding 
for the employer, but not always for all workers, i.e. in most cases only union members are formally 
bound by the plan. Non-union members still have the opportunity to demand for higher severance 
pay than those agreed upon in the social plan, with the risk however of not getting it. In section 
2.2.2 some examples of recent social plans are given.  
 
When both the employer and the trade union decide that the collective dismissal is inevitable, an 
announcement is made to the CWI, after which the permits for individual dismissals are demanded.4 
It is possible to report earlier to the CWI (i.e. before the negotiations with the trade union have 
started), but then a waiting period applies in which the employer is expected to negotiate with the 
trade union on the conditions of the collective dismissal. With respect to the choice of workers to 
dismiss, the employer has to follow certain rules. To start, the employer has to divide the workers 
in groups with similar jobs (i.e. based on the nature of the work, the working conditions and other 
conditions of the job). As to whom should be dismissed within these groups of workers, the 
seniority principle has been applied for years. This ‘last in, first out’ principle, holds that the worker 
with the shortest job duration is the first to become eligible for dismissal. To prevent an uneven age 
distribution within the firm or branch office, the seniority principle might be applied within age 
groups. An additional condition is that the age distribution of the workers that are eligible for 
dismissal is similar to that of the firm or branch office.  
 
                                                  
3 No literature is found on whether the works council can also advise the employers on who to dismiss.  
4 The court route is not available for collective dismissals (Deelen et al, 2006). 
26  Aias-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: The Netherlands 
Box 2.4: An example on the reflection principle for collective dismissal. 
Assume that 15 percent of the workers in a firm is aged between 25 and 35;  45 percent is aged between 35 and 
45; 35 percent is aged between 45 and 55; and 5 percent is aged over 55.  
25 workers in similar jobs have to be dismissed. Under the seniority principle, the first to be dismissed would be 
the ones with the shortest tenure. Under the reflection principle, however, the dismissals are spread among 
these age groups: 
→ 15% of 25 = 4 dismissals among the workers aged between 25 and 35 
→ 45% of 25 = 11 dismissals among the workers aged between 35 and 45 
→ 35% of 25 = 9 dismissals among the workers aged between 45 and 55 
→ 5% of 25 = 1 dismissals among the workers aged over 55 
Within the age groups the seniority principle is applied and persons with the shortest tenure are dismissed first. 
 
As from March, 2006, the seniority principle no longer is the leading principle in collective dismissal 
procedures. The general view is that it has a negative effect on the flexibility and innovativeness of 
employers and for this reason, Minister de Geus of Social Affairs and Employment changed the 
employment protection law in this respect. Key change is that under the old regulation, the age 
distribution of the company’s workforce before and after dismissal had to be similar. The new rule 
changes this into a similar age distribution among workers with similar jobs. For the company as a 
whole, however, there might be a change in the age distribution of the workforce. This principle is 
known as the ‘reflection’ principle (afspiegelingsprincipe, see Box 2.4). For employers the application 
of this principle is expected to be easier, for workers supervision on whether rules are correctly 
applied is expected to be easier and for the CWI execution is expected to be easier and hence 
procedures are expected to be shorter. A drawback of this change is that a higher percentage of 
older workers might become unemployed (CPB, 2006). The new regulation is also expected to 
make dismissal of incapable workers easier. In addition, problems might occur with respect to the 
definition of similar jobs. The question is who judges this? The employer, the works council, the 
labour union or the CWI? 
 
In addition, the minister proposed that the social partners should be able to decide themselves, in 
collective agreements, what dismissal criteria to use. This should even further relax employment 
protection in the Netherlands and increase the flexibility for the employer. Opponents of this, argue 
that this might negatively affect older workers. Since most of the early retirement routes have been 
tightened, full flexibility with respect to whom to dismiss in collective dismissal procedures might 
lead to an increased number of workers who retire early through unemployment. Yet, recent 
changes have been made to the system of unemployment insurance to discourage the use of this 
exit route, which are discussed in section 3, which might counteract this effect (CPB, 2006).  The 
proposal has not (yet) been adopted or rejected, the discussion is still ongoing.  
 
A final change in the system of employment protection made recently, though of a much smaller 
size, is that it is no longer the CWI but the trade union who judges the economic conditions for the 
collective dismissal. A written declaration of the trade unions that the economic reasons that the 
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employer had for the collective dismissal are verified by them is needed after which the CWI does 
not investigate the reasons anymore. This is expected to reduce the dismissal period via the CWI 
route. The CWI, however, might still oppose to these reasons on behalf of individual workers 
whose claims are based on new information, i.e. after the declaration of the unions has been written.  
 
2.2  EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION ON SECTOR LEVEL 
 
2.2.1 COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION REGULATION 
 
In 2005 about 750 CLA’s existed, covering about 85 percent of the employed labour force (SER, 
2006b). Just over one-fifth (23 percent) of these CLA’s are sector agreements, covering 86 percent 
of the workers under CLA. The remaining CLA’s are company CLA’s. In this section, an analysis is 
presented of provisions on employment protection in CLA’s. For this analysis, the FNV databank on 
CLA’s is used, which was set up in the early 1990s by the FNV (largest trade union in the 
Netherlands) and consists of all CLA’s of which the FNV was a negotiator, which is 92 percent 
(Schreuder & Tijdens, 2004). By the end of 2003, 983 different CLA’s are prevalent in the FNV 
Databank, including those that have expired. An in-depth analysis of all these CLA’s is not feasible 
within the time span of this study and the analysis is limited to an explorative study among a random 
set of current CLA’s in some sectors of industry, covering about a quarter of the workers under 
currently running CLA’s in the database.5 Table 2.5 shows a summary of these CLA’s.  
 
Table 2.5: Summary statistics of collective labour agreements included in the analysis. 
Sector  Number of collective agreements 
investigated 
Number of workers covered by the investigated 























(=25.4% of workers covered by CLA’s in data) 
Source: FNV CAO Databank, 2006. 
 
The analysis focuses on clauses on notice period, trial period, the number and maximum duration of 
a sequence of temporary contracts. We have investigated whether (a) provisions on these issues are 
made in the CLA’s and (b) whether and how these differ from the national regulations. A 
comparable study was undertaken by the Ministry of Social Affairs some years ago, in which case 
over a hundred of the largest CLA’s were analysed, covering about five million workers, 85 percent 
of all workers under a CLA (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2004a). Our preliminary results will be 
                                                  
5 In a future paper, a detailed analysis on the full set of collective agreements is performed. 
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compared with their results. Differences might be due to the fact that the CLA’s in our study are of 
a more recent date, or because in our study only a small fraction of the total number of CLA’s is 
analysed.  
 










legislation  Notice period at x years of tenure, x = 
        < 1 yr  1 yr  2 yrs  5 yrs  10 yrs  15 yrs  20 yrs 
Employer:  national  legislation  1m 1m 1m 2m 3m 4m 4m 
Agriculture  14  10  1  1m 1m 1m 5w 10w  13w  13w 
      3  2 to 4m, according to age of employee 
Construction 5  3  1  1m  1m 1m 5w 10w  13w  13w 
      1  1w 1w 2w 4w  10w  13w  13w 
Industry  30  17  8  1m 1m 1m 5w 10w  13w  13w 
      2  1m 1m 1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 
      1  1m 1m 1m 2m 3m 4m 4m 
      1  1m 1m 1m 2m 3m 4m 4m 
      1  1m 4m 4m 4m 4m 4m 4m 
Retail  15  14  1  >  1  m        
Education  5  1  4  2m 3m 3m 3m 3m 3m 3m 
Government  6  4  1  2m 3m 3m 3m 3m 3m 3m 
      1  2m 2m 2m 2m 2m 2m 2m 
Total  75  49  26         
Source: FNV CAO-Databank, 2006. 
 
Table 2.6 shows the results of the provisions on the employer’s notice periods. In about 65 percent 
of the CLA’s, no differences are found with national regulations (corresponding to 70 percent in the 
Ministry’s research). In the majority of cases in which a difference is found, this is for workers with 
contracts longer than two years. In one CLA (in the retail sector) a fixed notice period applies and 
in two (in agriculture) the notice period depends on the age of the worker rather than his tenure. In 
a group of CLA’s, the employer’s notice period is slightly shortened, with a maximum of thirteen 
weeks rather than four months. In the CLA’s analysed in the retail sector, hardly any differences are 
found with respect to the employer’s notice period, while in those from education, almost all differ 
from national legislation. In this latter sector, only one of the analysed CLA’s complies with national 
regulation. In the other four, longer notice periods for labour contracts with a duration in between 
six months and ten years are found. This is likely explained by the fact that the worker’s notice 
period is also longer in this sector, mainly because of teaching responsibilities. Law states that the 
worker’s notice period might not be shorter than that of the employer, implying that a longer 
worker notice period yields a longer employer’s notice period. Our analysis reveals that in 
education, the worker’s notice period is indeed equal to that of employers, at least for contracts 
longer than one year. In addition, about one third of the analysed CLA’s have special provisions for 
workers aged over 45. The notice period is longer, most likely reflecting the longer and more 
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difficult search for a new job for older workers as well as higher protection merely based on 
seniority (i.e. corporatist feature).  Finally, in three (in the agricultural and retail sector) of the CLA’s 
a longer notice period applies for higher level personnel. These findings correspond with those of 
the Ministry’s research. 
 
Another aspect of employment legislation that might be differently arranged in CLA’s is the trial 
period. During this period, the worker can be dismissed without notice (i.e. without costs for the 
employer) and a longer trial period therefore coincides with a lower protection level of the worker. 
Table 2.7 shows that in about 55 percent of the analysed CLA’s, no differences are found 
(corresponding to only 42 percent in the Ministry’s research). In the majority of divergent CLA’s (in 
28 out of the 34 cases), however, a general (maximum) trial period is agreed upon for all contracts, 
disregarding the duration of the contract. One could say that employment protection of workers on 
short-term contracts is reduced, or that flexibility on the employer’s side is increased.  
 










legislation  Provision in CLA: 
Agriculture  14  9  4  2m for all contracts 
      1  2w for contracts < 3m, 1m for contracts 3-12m,  
2m for contracts > 12m 
Construction 5  3  1  2w  for  contracts  < 1yr, 1m for contracts 1-2yrs,  
2m for contracts > 2 yrs 
      1  2m for all contracts 
Industry  30  15  13  2m for all contracts 
      1  1m for all contracts 
      1  no trial period 
Retail  15  7  8  2m for all contracts 
Education  5  4  1  2m for all contracts 
Government  6  3  2  2m for all contracts 
      1  no trial period, but trial contracts < 1yr. 
Total 75  41  34   
Source: FNV CAO-Databank, 2006. 
 
A final aspect of employment protection legislation which can be differently agreed upon in CLA’s 
are the provisions on the maximum number and duration of sequential temporary contracts. Table 
2.8 shows that in about 64 percent of the analysed CLA’s, no differences are found from national 
legislation. In 23 percent of the CLA’s, a difference is found with respect to the number of 
sequential temporary contracts allowed (corresponding to 19 percent in the Ministry’s research). In 
one CLA no limit is given, in three others it is higher than national legislation and in thirteen cases it 
is lower (e.g., the second contract gives rise to a  permanent contract). In fifteen percent of the 
CLA's, a difference is found with respect to the total duration of sequential temporary contracts 
(corresponding to 23 percent in the Ministry’s research). In seven cases it is shorter, implying higher 
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employment protection and in four cases it is longer, of which two are for researchers who are 
likely to work on research projects with a longer time span. In eight percent of the CLA’s, a 
difference is found with respect to the interval time in between temporary contracts (corresponding 
to 30 percent in the Ministry’s research). In all cases this interval is shortened from three months to 
31 days or even seven days.   
 
Table 2.8: Provisions on total duration and number of sequential temporary contracts in collective labour agreements.  










Different provisions mentioned 
Agriculture  14 7 4  Interval is 31 days; sequence and duration according to law 
     2  Permanent when 2nd contract (interval is 7 days) 
     1  Permanent when total duration >24m or 3rd contract  
Construction 
5  2  1  Permanent when total duration >12m and 2nd contract, or 3rd  
contract  
     1  Permanent when total duration >12m 
     1  Permanent when 3rd contract 
Retail  15 12 1  Permanent when 3rd contract  
     2  Permanent when total duration > 24m 
Industry  30 20 1  Permanent when total duration > 72m or 7th contract 
     1  Permanent when 2nd contract 
     1  In general no sequence, but ‘out or in’. 
     1  Permanent when 5th contract  
     1  Only 1 extension possible. 
     2  Permanent when total duration >24m or 4th contract 
     2  Permanent when 2nd contract 
     1  Permanent when 3rd contract (from 01/04/05 - 31/03/07, 4th ) 
Education  5 3  1  Permanent when total duration > 8 yrs, unlimited sequence 
     1  Permanent when total duration >36m, or 7th contract. 
Government 
6  4  1  Permanent when either total duration >3yrs, 4th contract or for 1 
job with a total duration of 6yrs, 3rd contract 
 
    1  Permanent when total duration > 6yrs, or 4th contract (scientific 
personnel only) 
Total  75 48  27   
Source: FNV CAO-Databank, 2006. 
 
2.2.2 SOCIAL PLANS – SOME FEATURES 
 
Apart from collective labour agreements, trade unions are actively involved in the negotiation of 
social plans. As explained before, these apply in situations of collective dismissals. Analogous to the 
analysis on the provisions in CLA’s, we have investigated some social plans to see what provisions 
are found. At this point, the explorative analysis is limited to a small number of social plans (thirteen, 
see appendix for details) that have been made publicly available on the trade unions websites.   
The criteria for dismissal are thoroughly described in all social plans. In most cases workers are 
made redundant because the organisation has to shrink or because certain activities are terminated. 
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In three of the social plans the seniority principle is the leading principle for selecting whom to 
dismiss, however in one case it is explicitly mentioned that there is room for application of the 
reflection principle if the age distribution of the company would change too much. In three of the 
social plans the latter principle is the leading principle, and in one social plan the selection has to be 
negotiated with the works council. In the other social plans the selection condition is not specifically 
mentioned and national law applies accordingly.  
 
In all social plans details are provided with respect to the replacement possibilities of the redundant 
workers, either internal or external. These vary considerably between the social plans. In some 
social plans, a replacement period is applied in which the redundant worker receives support to be 
internally replaced. Training costs, both training for new tasks and assessment trainings are paid for 
by the employer. In addition, when a job within the firm is found, in most social plans detailed 
information is given on what costs are paid by the employer, including moving costs to a new place if 
necessary, possible costs for double rent in case of such move and in one social clause a ‘discomfort 
compensation’ is mentioned. In case the wage in the new job is lower than the old wage, either a 
temporary compensation is paid (with a common maximum of 24 to 26 months), or the new wage is 
being supplemented (usually depending on the worker’s age). When no internal job is found for the 
worker, in most cases again a replacement period applies. In this period, the worker gets support via 
professional job agencies paid by the employer and in most cases when he finds a new job within 
this time span, he receives a subsidy for ‘fast leaving’ (vertrekstimulering). This subsidy varies from 50 
to 100 percent of his gross wage. In case the wage in the new job is lower than his old wage, again a 
compensation is paid in most cases, depending on the worker’s age and tenure.  
 
When no suitable internal or external job is found, a formal dismissal procedure is started, as 
described in section 2.1. With respect to severance pay in case of dismissal, the following clauses are 
found in the analysed social plans. In six out of the ten social plans a severance pay is granted which 
is equal to the neutral (with a correction factor of one) court rule. In two social plans a correction 
factor below one is applied for all employees and in two cases the correction factor depends on the 
worker’s age. It varies from 0.75 for workers aged below 45 to 1.6 for workers aged over 55. In one 
social plan a different regulation applies, ranging from one monthly wage for worker with a tenure 
shorter than four years to five for workers with a tenure of over 25 years. In addition, an age-
related supplement is granted for workers aged over 45, ranging from two to four months wage. In 
two social plans, finally, no clause is found on severance pay, but the earlier mentioned subsidies to 
encourage fast leaving are present here.  
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2.3 THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONS SUMMARISED  
 
In this section, a brief summary is presented on the role and responsibilities of the main institutions 
involved in Dutch employment protection. First, national legislation is set by the national 
government, i.e. dismissal procedural rules, notice period, trial period, number and maximum 
duration of a sequence of temporary contracts. An important advisory task is given to the SER, in 
which  employers’ organisations and trade unions are represented. Severance pay according to the 
so-called ‘court rule’ is not determined by law, but by practice.  
 
In national legislation, room is left for divergence on sectoral or individual level, in collective labour 
agreements or individual labour contracts (only when specifically mentioned in collective 
agreements). Collective labour agreements are the result of collective bargaining between the trade 
unions and the concerning employers and individual labour contracts are the result of bargaining 
between the individual worker and the employer. Although in our preliminary analysis here it was 
not possible to determine the share of workers in the labour force to whom the differences apply, 
the findings suggest that sectoral divergence is likely to be around thirty percent. This shows the 
influence of trade unions. The provisions in the collective labour agreements, are found to be a 
substitute for national legislation, i.e. an explicit divergence from national legislation. In some sectors, 
employment protection is re-enforced by the collective labour agreements (e.g., education) while in 
others it is reduced (e.g., industry). A more detailed analysis on this point is necessary to establish 
the impact of trade unions on employment protection. Sectoral legislation is to become of greater 
importance in case the government would step back from employment protection policies. In 
addition, for collective dismissals works councils are involved as an advisory institution and the trade 
unions are involved in the establishment of the social plan, i.e. the conditions for the collective 
dismissal.   
 
As for the implementation of employment protection rules, two institutions can be responsible: 
either the CWI, a public institution, or the court, a civil law institution. Both institutions test 
whether national, sectoral and individual regulations are correctly applied to the specific dismissal 
case and accordingly grant permission for the dismissal. In sum, for a dismissal by court, the costs 
are relatively high, the time span is relatively short, the dismissal report to be prepared is minimal, a 
severance pay is granted in most cases, a short or a fictitious notice period applies (during which the 
worker receives no wage, but can rely on his severance pay), uncertainty on the outcome is low. 
The route cannot be used for collective dismissals and is mainly used by large firms for the dismissal 
of young workers (because the costs are related to the worker’s age). For dismissals by the CWI,  
costs are relatively low, the time span is relatively long, the dismissal report to be prepared is 
elaborate, no severance pay is granted, a notice period applies (during which the worker remains on 
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the payroll), and the workers can be eligible for unemployment benefits. This dual dismissal system 
dates back from the second World War and recently discussion has been re-opened on the 
abolishment of the dismissal procedures by the CWI, yet while protecting the weaker groups among 
the working population. Collective dismissals are dealt with by the CWI, who usually permits the 
dismissal since the trade unions were already involved in the determination of the conditions for the 
collective dismissal.  
 
34  Aias-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: The Netherlands 
3 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE  
 
3.1 NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
 
The current system of national unemployment insurance legislation (WW, WerkloosheidsWet) in the 
Netherlands was established in 1949. This law provided in either unemployment benefits or 
‘reduced pay’ (wachtgeld, for civil servants) consisting of seventy percent of previous wages, 
depending on the worker’s employment history. Since then a great deal of reforms have been made. 
For this paper, we describe the system existing as from March 30, 2006 when the latest reforms 
have been implemented and we include some of the changes implemented in recent years (after 
2002), as presented in Table 3.1. 6  
 
Table 3.1: Recent changes in the Dutch system of unemployment insurance, 2002-2006 
Year  Measure 
2006  Abolishment of short-term flat-rate unemployment benefits. Workers who are not entitled to earnings-
related unemployment benefits previously received short-term benefit based on minimum wage.  
2006  Reduced duration of earnings-related benefits from a maximum of 5 years to a maximum of 38 months. In 
addition, replacement rate during the first 2 months is increased from 70 to 75 percent.  
2006 Abolishment  ‘verwijtbaarheidstoets’. Previously a worker who lost his job had to show he was not 
blamefully unemployed for this, to become entitled to unemployment benefits.  
2006  Tightening of entitlement conditions: now employment in 26 out of previous 36 weeks rather than 
previous 39 weeks. 
2005  Trial employment while maintaining entitlement to unemployment benefits. Workers who have been 
unemployed for at least six months, can start working on a trial basis for three months without losing 
their benefit entitlement.  
2005  Actual work history from 1998 determines the duration of unemployment benefits. For the years before 
1998 the working history is still fictitiously determined based on age. Previously the actual working 
history only concerned the final five years. 
2005   WALVIS, new legislation on administrative reduction of social insurance contributions and simplification 
of social security laws. 
2004  Job search requirement unemployed aged over 57.5 years. The unemployed aged over 57.5 years used to 
be exempted from active job search.  
2004  Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB), municipalities now fully responsible for social assistance 
administration. 
2003   Abolishment of follow-up benefits. When the duration of the earnings-related benefits was expired, 
workers were entitled to a follow-up benefit for 2 years at 70 percent of the minimum wage.  
2003  WFSV, Financing Social Security Act, changes way in which social insurance contributions are collected. 
2002  SUWI, change in administration of social insurance including, among others, the creation of one single 
Social Insurance Agency (UWV).  
Source: UWV (2006b) 
 
3.1.1 ENTITLEMENT CONDITIONS 
 
The entitlement conditions for unemployment insurance are determined by law. As in the case with 
employment protection legislation, in most cases first an advice is obtained from the SER. Another 
institution, the Council for Work and Income (RWI), established in 2002, consisting of 
                                                  
6 See Hoogenboom (2007) for an elaborate historical overview of unemployment insurance in the Netherlands. 
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representatives of employers, workers and municipalities, also advices the government on work and 
income policies. The latter institution was created with the full reorganisation of the administration 
of the system of unemployment insurance under the SUWI (see section 3.1.2). While the SER mainly 
advises the government on the medium and longer term, the RWI advice focuses on the short term 
(Obbink, 2002).  
 
Entitlement to unemployment benefits first depends on whether the worker is blamefully 
unemployed (e.g., to reduce moral hazard). Law states that a worker is blamefully unemployed when 
there is serious misbehaviour usually followed by dismissal on the spot (e.g., theft, violence, refusal 
of work), when he resigns without reasonable reasons, or when he has not tried his best to keep his 
job (e.g., by participation in re-training activities, talking to his employer about other job possibilities 
within the company) or objected against his dismissal. With the set of changes to the system of 
unemployment insurance, the test for whether the worker is blamefully unemployed is partly 
relaxed. The clause stating that ‘the worker has to have tried his best to keep his job when a mutual 
agreement is reached on the dismissal’ is dropped in the new legislation. The claim is that this leads 
to less pro forma cases as explained in section 2, which benefits the employer. One might argue, 
that, although flexibility on the labour market might increase (e.g., easier lay off), more workers 
might claim unemployment benefits than before since the test is relaxed. Yet, other changes in the 
system such as the shortened duration of benefits and increased reintegration efforts (see section 4) 
might counteract this effect.   
 
Entitlement to unemployment benefits further depends on the worker’s employment history. To be 
entitled to unemployment benefits, he should have been employed in 26 out of the previous 36 
weeks. This so-called ‘weeks condition’ has recently (March 30, 2006) been tightened to reduce the 
inflow into unemployment insurance. It used to be 26 out of the previous 39 weeks. If this 
requirement is not met, no entitlement to unemployment benefits exist and the worker can apply 
for social assistance benefits (more on these later). If the worker, however, meets this ‘weeks 
condition”, he is entitled to unemployment benefits. 
 
For workers who meet this ‘weeks condition’ , a basic unemployment benefit exists with a 
maximum duration of three months. An earnings-related benefit is being paid: for the first two 
months the worker receives 75 percent of previous wages and in the third month he receives 70 
percent. Benefits are maximised by law. The maximum daily wage is 168 euro yielding a maximum 
monthly benefit of about 2365 euro. For workers whose unemployment benefits are below the 
social minimum a supplement is granted until the level of benefits are equal to the social minimum 
(i.e. 59.06 euro for couples, 41.34 euro for single persons and 53.16 euro for single parents, 2006). 
This system has only recently been introduced, in October 2006. For workers who became 
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unemployed before this date, the old system still holds. Under this system a short-term 
unemployment benefit is being paid for a maximum of six months. This benefit, however is flat-rate 
and amounted to seventy percent of the minimum wage, again with the supplement for people 
below the social minimum. With the new system, which grants higher benefits but for a shorter 
period, the mobility in and out unemployment is expected to increase (Buevink, 2005). This is 
expected to enhance the worker’s probability to find his optimal job match. 
 
For workers who also meet the ‘years condition’ (i.e. they have worked in four out of the previous 
five years) in addition to the ‘weeks condition’, the earnings related benefit is paid for a longer 
period of time. Depending on the working history the duration is three to 38 months. For each year 
of working experience, a month of benefit is received, with the minimum of three months of the 
first mentioned benefits. Again the worker receives 75 percent of previous wages in the first two 
months and as from the third month onwards he receives 70 percent. The higher benefits in the first 
two months are expected to work as a ‘search subsidy’ and encourage fast outflow out of 
unemployment (Buevink, 2005). The maximum duration of benefits is 38 months. Before January 
2004, a follow-up unemployment benefit existed for the latter group of unemployed. This was paid 
for an additional two years and amounted to 70 percent of the legal minimum wage. This follow-up 
unemployment benefit is abolished in December, 2003, to encourage the outflow out of 
unemployment. 
 
With respect to the percentage of workers in the different benefit groups, Figure 3.1 shows that 
about 70 to 80 percent of the unemployed workers are entitled to the earnings-related benefit (SER, 
2004). About one-fifth of the people who become unemployment do not meet the years condition 
(which are likely to be young workers and women) and only receive the short-term unemployment 
benefit. For a small number of workers, entitlement to a follow-up benefit is granted, due to the 
revival of  former benefit rights7. 
 
To keep entitlement to unemployment benefits, the worker has to search actively for a job, with a 
minimum of four search activities within four weeks. Search activities refer to sending an application 
letter (whether an open application or a response to a vacancy add), having an application interview 
(when this follows an earlier letter, these count for two activities), doing assessment tests or other 
to find out capabilities and interests, calling or visiting a company to ask for vacancies, registering at 
a temporary work agency and starting one’s own business (making business plans, talking to 
investors etc.). For all search activities, proof has to be kept, such as letters, names and telephone 
                                                  
7 For example, under the old system benefits were appointed for a minimum period. In case the worker found a job within this 
period, the ‘remaining unemployment benefits’ were saved and when the workers lost his job again within a certain time span, 
the old benefit revived. 
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numbers of people spoken to. The sanctions when not meeting the search activities are that benefits 
are being cut or withdrawn. More on the support for reintegration into the workforce in Section 4. 
 
Figure 3.1: The unemployed by type of unemployment benefit (% of new benefit claims only), 1998-2003. 
 
Source: SER (2004) 
 
When unemployment benefits are exhausted, or in case of non-entitlement to unemployment 
benefits, the unemployed worker can apply for social assistance. Unlike unemployment benefits, 
social assistance is means-tested on family income. The individual is still expected to actively look for 
work, yet monitoring is different compared to the situation with unemployment benefits (see 
section 4). Social assistance benefits only provide minimum incomes, for example for single people 
without children benefits can amount to seventy percent of the minimum wage (including housing 
benefits). As with unemployment benefits, sanctions such as cuts in the benefits or a fine are applied 
when the entitlement conditions are not met, for example when the individual has additional 
unreported income or when he is not actively looking for a job.  
 
3.1.2 PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the main institutions and their relation in the so-called chain of Work and Income, 
established in 2002 with the SUWI law. With this new law, the government wanted to establish ‘less 
government and more market’ in the implementation of social security law. A mix was proposed 
between public and private institutions in the implementation of social security. While the 
judgement of social security claims and the provision of benefits remained in public hands, active 
labour market policy was moved to the private sector (de Heer, 2002). With respect to the 
provision of unemployment benefits, there are three main institutions in the Netherlands: The CWI 
(introduced in section 2), the UWV (see Box 3.1) and the Municipal Social Service (i.e. the 
municipalities). In addition, private reintegration companies are used for the reintegration of 
unemployed workers (see section 4). 
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Figure 3.2: The chain of work and Income. 
 
 
The Inspection of Work and Income (IWI) is responsible for the supervision on the administrative 
institutions for social security. It is independent but has an indirect relation with the government, 
with the minister of Social Affairs in particular. The Inspection regularly reports on the supervision 
tasks to the minister. The minister of Social Affairs responsible for the direction and control of the 
implementation of unemployment insurance. Before the 1990s, the trade unions had an important 
role in the administration of unemployment insurance, a short overview of their historical role is 
presented in Box 3.2.8
 
Box 3.1: The UWV. 
The Social Security Agency (UWV) is a ZBO under assignment of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment. Until 2002, the implementation of social security was divided among five sectoral institutions: GAK 
(largest, Joint Administration Office) Cadans (sectors care and well-being, chain store, retail, craftsmen and 
cleaning), GUO (agriculture, tobacco and meat sector), Cordares (construction), USZO (civil servants). These 
were with the SUWI law merged into one institution, the UWV (de Heer, 2002). This rather complex merger 
takes some years to be complete, since the administration and implementation processes of the five different 
institutions have to be synchronised. During the first two years, the names were partly kept, e.g., UWV Cadans, 
UWV GAK etcetera. As from 2004, the name for all branches is changed into UWV, however, still some 
activities are left to certain branch offices. For example, claims of civil servants are still handled at the Leeuwarden 
branch, the former USZO office. Especially with respect to the administration of disability benefits, a great deal of 
problems existed. For example, for medical examinations different physicians were used, according to the sector 
in which the disabled workers was employed. The UWV now consists of 31 branch offices and has around 20,000 
employees. The main tasks of the UWV are shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
                                                  
8 See footnote 1.  
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Box 3.2: The historical role of trade unions in the social insurance administration  
After the Second World War the general opinion was that the social partners should have an important role in 
the administration of social security, in particular of the workers’ insurances (e.g., unemployment insurance, 
disability insurance). With the Act Organisation Social Insurance (Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekeringen, 1952) a new 
organisational structure for the administration of social security was established. The administration of workers’ 
insurances was left to the trade associations (bedrijfsverenigingen) that were organised by sector (i.e., one trade 
association per sector) and all employers in the sector were associated by law. The board of these trade 
associations was formed by representatives of trade unions and employers’ organisations. The trade associations’ 
objectives were: judgement of benefit claims, payment of benefits, monitoring beneficiaries, collection of 
contributions and management of unemployment funds. In addition, trade unions were part of the Social 
Insurance Council (Sociale Verzekeringsraad) that monitored the administration of social insurance.  
During the 1980s, when the costs of social security increased rapidly, criticism on the system increased. In 1993, 
the report Buurmeier was published after an inquiry to the efficiency of social security administration. The main 
conclusions presented in this report were that the current organisational structure was no longer efficient, mainly 
due to the increased inflow into unemployment and disability insurance and reduced outflow out of disability 
insurance. In addition, doubts were raised about the representativeness of the trade unions, because of the low 
union densities. As a consequence, the administration social insurance was changed. The trade associations were 
abolished and replaced by five administration offices (Uvi’s), who were responsible for the administration of social 
insurance. The social partners were now part of the National Institute for Social Insurance (Lisv, Landelijk Instituut 
Sociale Verzekeringen), the principal for the administration of social insurance and manager of the social insurance 
funds. In addition, their role in the monitoring process was also reduced, with the abolishment of the Social 
Insurance Council by an independent monitoring institute, the Committee of Monitoring Social Insurance (College 
van toezicht sociale verzekeringen).  
With the second organisational change in social insurance within a relatively short time span, the SUWI II 2000, 
the role of the social partners in the social insurance administration was further reduced. The uvi’s were 
abolished and the administration of social insurance was now in the hands of the UWV, as explained in the main 
text. Reintegration activities of the beneficiaries was privatised. The social partners’ role is now merely advisory 
role through their representation in the SER, STAR and RWI. Furthermore, collective bargaining and the 
establishment of collective labour agreements is still one of their main activities.  
Source: Berkhout et al. (2003) 
 
The relation between these institutions and the procedures with respect to unemployment 
insurance will now be explained. The first step for an unemployed worker is to register at the CWI. 
He has to do so the moment he knows he is going to lose his job, whether his temporary contract 
ends or whether he is going to be fired, and no later than one day after the first date of 
unemployment. After registration at the CWI, an intake takes place to collect information on 
previous working history, education history, medical history and the family situation of the 
individual. The individual also receives immediate information on how to find a job as soon as 
possible, i.e. he receives a login for the CWI website on which a large number of vacancies are 
published and where the individual can make a curriculum vitae that is accessible by employers. 
After a legal transfer period of eight days, the CWI sends an application for unemployment benefits 
to the UWV or for social assistance to the municipal Social Service. An important evaluation 
measure in this respect is the prevention quote of the CWI, which is the percentage of unemployed 
workers who find a job within these eight days, i.e. without having to apply for unemployment 
benefits. Table 3.2 shows that this quote was 20,1 percent in 2005 (the target was twenty percent as 
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is the target for 2006, CWI (2006b)). It is slightly higher for men than for women, and for younger 
workers it is twice as high as older workers. This is what one would expect.  
 
Table 3.2: Prevention quote unemployment insurance., 2003-2005. 
Realised Prevention quote  Year 



















Source: CWI yearly reports, 2000-2005.  
 
After receipt of the dossier on the individual, the UWV or the municipal Social Service have a legal 
obligation to handle the case within eight weeks. In 2005, about 94 percent of the applications for 
unemployment benefits at the UWV were handled within this period, compared to about ninety 
percent in 2004 (UWV, 2006c). Before the introduction of the UWV in 2002, when the 
implementation of social security law was divided over five different institutions (the uvi’s, largely 
organised by sector), this procedure took longer. For example, the institution responsible for the 
government sector (USZO) only had about one fifth of the claims judged in time (IWI, 2002a).  The 
UWV currently has three relevant objectives (Koning & Deelen, 2003): (1) to handle benefit claims 
in time and ensure a high level of customer service with respect to benefit administration and 
contribution collection; (2) legitimacy and efficacy with respect to benefit payment; (3) reintegration 
of clients. 
 
When unemployment benefits are granted, the unemployed worker receives a monthly form of the 
UWV at which he has to register his search activities, complete with the information of contact 
persons, to keep his entitlement to benefits. The worker also needs to inform the UWV of planned 
holidays and sickness or other mutations that relate to his search activities. In a recent study on the 
unemployed in the Netherlands, it was found that the average number of search activities is four in 
the past four weeks (Schils et al., 2006). Figure 3.3 shows the average number of search activities by 
the duration of unemployment for people receiving unemployment benefits. In general, the 
requirement of four applications in four weeks is not met by the unemployed. In between months 
four and six, search activity is higher. This is likely to be explained by the fact that the short-term 
unemployment benefit (which was still in practice during the period of the research) is only granted 
for six months, after which the unemployed worker falls back into the much lower social assistance 
benefits. This increases his search activity. It is well-known that a limited duration of benefits 
increases the exit probability out of unemployment (Lalive et al., 2006, among others). Unfortunately 
the data do not show what type of unemployment benefits the workers have.  
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Figure 3.3: The average number of search activities relative to unemployment duration (in months), 2005. 
 
Source: Schils et al. (2006). 
 
To find a job, several support possibilities exist for the unemployed worker. The first six months of 
his unemployment, a job seeker is classified as Group A or phase 1 by the CWI and is left on his 
own. He can search for himself, looking for vacancies in newspapers, at vacancy websites, company 
websites or temporary working agencies. Exceptions are situations in which the CWI believes that 
the job finding probability of the job seeker is very small or when he himself asks for support. In 
2005, 59.3 percent of the unemployed registered at the CWI. About 46 percent of these individuals 
found a job without making use of the CWI vacancy website, pointing to the intermediary function 
of the CWI in reintegration of the unemployed worker (CWI, 2006b). Second, job seekers who do 
not found a job within six months are transferred to the UWV and can enrol in a reintegration 
program. More details on this in section 4 on active labour market policy. 
 
The UWV devotes about a quarter of its capacity to the prevention of fraud. Using interviews 
among benefit recipients, compliance is measured. This refers to the percentage of clients who are 
known with the conditions and sanctions related to their benefits. The compliance percentage 
ranges from 75 to 90 percent, indicating that the majority of benefit recipients know the rules of the 
game (UWV, 2006e). Figure 3.4 shows the total number of detected fraud cases by the UWV for 
unemployment beneficiaries.  
 
The number of detected fraud cases has declined slightly since 2000 with about two percentage 
points to about four percent of the total number of beneficiaries. The UWV argues that this is 
mainly due to a better monitoring of the UWV (UWV, 2006e). In about seventy percent of the 
fraud cases the fraud was detected within three months after the start of the fraud. The sanctions 
mainly concern full or partial reduction of benefits or a formal warning. In line with the high 
percentage of fraud cases related to unemployment insurance, the majority of measures is applied to 
such benefit recipients. With the detected fraud cases, the UWV has saved about 179 million on 
benefits (all benefits, not only unemployment benefits) in 2005 (UWV, 2006c). 
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Source: UWV (2005). 
 
3.1.3 THE GROUP OF INSURED AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The group of individuals contributing to unemployment insurance consists of workers aged under 65 
in paid employment (including people in public services but excluding the self-employed or free-
lance workers) and people without a job on a disability, sickness or unemployment benefit. These 
are all compulsory insured. In addition, people can be voluntarily insured (e.g., the self-employed and 
free-lance workers). The voluntary insured can determine, with a maximum, the insured wage and 
contributions are paid accordingly. The maximum daily insurance wage is 168 euro, similar to the 
maximum for compulsory insured employees. Contributions are 5.43 percent of daily (maximised) 
wages, which is higher than that of compulsory insured workers as we will shortly see.  
 
Table 3.3. shows that by the end of 1998 about 6.4 million people were insured for unemployment 
and in 2004 the group of insured was about 6.9 million people. About 85 percent of them was 
insured because of their employment relation and 15 percent because of a social benefit or because 
of voluntary insurance. With a labour force population of 10.6 million people, about sixty percent of 
them is insured corresponding to about 92.2 percent of the working population, which consisted of 
6.9 million people in 1998. (In 2004 the percentage of the working population that is insured has 
remained 92 percent). 
 
The contributions for unemployment insurance are paid by the employers. Until the beginning of 
2006, these were paid to the UWV, but with the Act Financing Social Insurance these are collected 
by the tax office. The main reason for this is to have only one institution for the employer, with 
respect to payment of social contributions and taxes. For workers, the UWV remains the main 
institution, and therefore contributions of the voluntarily insured are still collected by the UWV. 
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Table 3.3: The number of people insured for unemployment insurance, 1998. 
  Absolute  % of total 
People in paid employment  
(including those partly receiving benefits) 
5.454.000 85.1 
People on disability benefits 




People on unemployment benefits 
(excluding those partly in paid employment) 
234.300 3.7 
People on sickness benefits 
(excluding those partly in paid employment) 
58.000 0.9 
Voluntary insured  3.900  0.06 
Total number of insured  6.411.200  100 
Source: UWV(2005) 
 
The employers pay both their own part and the worker’s part. The contributions consists of two 
types. First both employer and worker pay contributions into the unemployment insurance fund 
(WW-awf), independent of actual unemployment. The employer pays 3.45 percent on wages and the 
worker pays 5.2 percent. With respect to this, a maximum wage and a franchise exists. The 
franchise is the part of the wage on which no unemployment contributions are levied. For 2006, the 
maximum wage is set at 168 euro a day (corresponding to 3,654 euro a month for a fulltime 
worker) and the franchise is 58 euro a day (corresponding to 1,261.50 for a fulltime worker). For 
certain groups of partly disabled workers, the employer can receive a reduction on the 
unemployment contributions. These groups concern workers that before received disability 
benefits, or those who have no entitlement to disability benefits because their disability is less than 
35 percent, or those who are notified by the CWI as ‘difficult to employ’ or those who work for 
Social Workplaces (e.g., mentally or physically disabled persons).  
 
Second, a sector-specific contribution (WW-wgf, sectoral reduced payment fund) has to be paid, yet 
only by the employer. These contributions are used to pay the first half year of the worker’s 
unemployment benefits. The level of these contributions depends on the unemployment risk in the 
sector. Contributions vary from 0.50 percent to 12.50 percent of the worker’s wage 
(Belastingdienst, 2006).  In some sectors, where unemployment is of a repeating nature (e.g., 
agricultural business, construction companies, hotel and restaurant industry, cultural companies and 
painting companies) employers are allowed to use lower contribution rates for personnel on 
permanent contracts. Recently, Minister de Geus proposed to relate this sector-specific 
contribution to the duration of contracts, with the intention to reduce the number of repeating 
unemployment spells. These mainly burden the reduced payment funds of which the first six months 
of unemployment benefits are being paid. With the lowering of Wgf-contributions for contracts that 
last at least a year, the minister wants to reduce this pressure (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2004b).  
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Table 3.4 shows the balancing accounts for unemployment benefits of the UWV for 2003-2005. It 
can be seen that the UWV has built a surplus in recent years and as a consequence, the UWV 
recently advised the Minister of Social Affairs to reduce the contributions for unemployment 
insurance. This is now part of the proposed government budget for next year (Miljoenennota 2006). 
In the past, the government was rather reluctant to reduce unemployment contributions, partly 
because of uncertainty with respect to future unemployment risk and partly because the funds had a 
positive effect on the public debt, which was advantageous in light of the EMU conditions. The 
largest part of the costs of unemployment insurance are made for the judgement of benefit claims 
(Koning & Deelen, 2003). As for the efficiency of this, in 2001 about ten percent of the claims was 
incorrectly granted due to incomplete information or mistakes made by the UWV (IWI, 2002b), 
compared to only one percent in 2005 (UWV, 2006c). Recent research showed that the efficiency 
of the UWV has increased, explaining the lower incorrectly granted benefit claims, yet 
improvements can still be made in the field of customer service. Especially the cooperation with the 
CWI has to be improved and standardisation of procedures needs to be accelerated. The UWV has 
been mostly busy with the merger and its consequences (e.g., former sector specialists now have to 
be trained to be all-round UWV workers) and room for customer service improvement was limited. 
(see recent reports on the evaluation of SUWI law implementation of PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2006) or TNO (2006)).  
 
Table 3.4: Costs and benefits of unemployment insurance (x1,000), 2003-2005 
  2003  2004  2005 
Benefits 
    Contributions 












    Unemployment benefits 
    Social expenditures
2
    Other 
















Result 1,919  1,632  2,425 
1Via ‘reduced pay funds’ (wachtgeldfondsen), some public money for reintegration ‘sluitende aanpak’ and received 
interest. 
2To employers, don’t know (yet) what is meant by this. 
Source: UWV Yearly Reports 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
 
Social assistance benefits are tax financed, by income tax paid by all citizens. Each year, the central 
government attributes a budget to all municipalities for the administration of social assistance. The 
level of the budget depends on previous years’ budget, the number of social assistance benefits paid, 
the size of the labour force and the education level of the labour force. Table 3.5 shows some 
indications of the budgets attributed to the six largest cities in the Netherlands as well as the 
number of social assistance beneficiaries at March 1, 2006. The budget consists of an ‘income 
budget’ to finance the payment of social assistance benefits and a ‘work budget’ to finance the 
reintegration activities. When a municipality exceeds its budget, an own-risk applies of ten percent 
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of the income budget, to increase efficiency. For example, suppose a municipality received fifty 
million euro for the income budget, the first five million euro exceeding these fifty million are for 
the municipal account itself. In case the actual expenditures are even higher than that, a formal 
investigation by the IWI is decisive for whether the central government pays for it or not. Only in 
case the higher expenditures are not due to mistakes or inefficiency of the municipality (e.g., 
economic shocks), the central government pays. Finally, the municipality can use a possible surplus 
for other means, which is meant as an incentive to reduce the inflow into social assistance. Although 
the small municipalities complain that they do not have sufficient means to back up any deficiencies, 
in general the municipalities are satisfied with the new system (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2005). 
 
Table 3.5: Indicative budgets for social assistance attributed to municipalities, 2006. 






































Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2006), CBS(2006b) 
 
The efficiency of the implementation of the Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB, Wet Werk en 
Bijstand) by the municipalities, is evaluated on municipal level. With respect to the reintegration 
efficiency of the municipalities, see section 4 of this report. A detailed study of the efficiency with 
respect to the income budget per municipality, however, goes beyond the scope of this study (see 
www.gemeenteloket.szw.nl for some evaluation reports).  
 
3.2 SECTORAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
 
In some sectors, supplementary unemployment insurance exists. These are recorded in the CLA’s 
negotiated by the trade unions and employers’ organisations or company representatives if no such 
organisation exists. Again, as in section 3.1.2, we analysed 75 CLA’s. Table 3.6 shows that in 44 
percent of these, provisions on supplementary unemployment insurance exists, acting as a 
complement to national legislation. In some sectors, almost all CLA’s contain provisions on this, 
such as in construction, education and government. In 20 percent of the analysed CLA’s the 
provisions are for all workers covered by the CLA, and the level of benefits after supplements varies 
from 70 to 82 percent (of non-maximised previous wages). In some CLA’s the provisions are only 
for workers who are also partially disabled or for older workers who are made redundant.  In both 
cases, up to 100 percent of previous earnings is granted. In other CLA’s supplementary benefits are 
paid in case of working hours reduction or suspension of business activities (e.g., due to weather 
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conditions or other external factors).  In this case, again up to 100 percent of previous earnings is 
granted.  
 











legislation  Special provisions 
Construction  5  1  2  8 wks to 80% of previous wage 
      2  13 wks to 80% of previous wage 
Retail  15  14  1  1 yr to 100% in case of partial disability 
Industry  30  30  5  1 yr to 100% in case of partial disability 
      5  to 100% in case of working hours reduction. 
Agriculture  14  5  1  8 wks to 80% of previous wage 
      6  for older workers. 
      1  to 100% in case of working hours reduction. 
      1  1 yr to 100% in case of partial disability 
Education 5  1 3 
1 yr to 78%, afterwards to 70% (earningsrelated benefit) or 
to 108% of minimumwage (short-term benefit) 
      1  1 yr to 83%, afterwards to 75% (earningsrelated benefit). 
Government  6  1  4  1 yr to 80%, afterwards to 70% (earningsrelated benefit). 
      1  1 yr to 78%, afterwards to 70% (earningsrelated benefit). 
 75  52  33   
Source: FNV CAO-Databank, 2006. 
 
Apart from provisions in CLA’s, social plans might also contain provisions on supplementary 
unemployment insurance. In nine out of the thirteen analysed social plans, no additional provisions 
were given on such supplements, yet in case a severance pay is granted, this might be received as 
supplements on national unemployment insurance (i.e. in monthly terms). In four social plans, 
provisions are included on a supplementary unemployment insurance. In all cases this supplement is 
given for the full duration of unemployment benefits and starts with 90 or 95 percent of previous 
wages and ends with 80 or 90 percent of previous wages. This supplement is much more generous 
than that in case of ‘normal’  unemployment, i.e. not as a consequence of a reorganisation or 
bankruptcy.  
 
3.3 THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONS SUMMARISED 
 
In this section, a brief summary is presented on the role and responsibilities of the main institutions 
involved in Dutch unemployment insurance. As in the case of employment protection, national 
legislation on unemployment insurance is set by the government, i.e. contribution levels, entitlement 
conditions, benefit levels and benefit duration. Again, the SER has an important advisory task, but 
advice on unemployment insurance also comes from the RWI (in which the municipalities are 
represented) and the UWV (the Social Security Agency). Dutch unemployment insurance shares 
some corporatist features in that there is strong link to the working history. Benefits are relatively 
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generous. In addition, social assistance, i.e. unemployment insurance for workers who do not meet 
the entitlement conditions for the regular unemployment insurance, shares social-democratic 
features in that benefits are universal, though means-tested.  
 
In collective labour agreements on the sector or company level, supplementary unemployment 
insurance can be provided. In contrast to the provisions on employment protection in collective 
labour agreements, provisions on unemployment insurance are not a substitute for national 
legislation, but complementary. Entitlement to sectoral provisions is only open for those workers 
who are entitled to national unemployment insurance. Benefit levels are increased, yet benefit 
duration is similar to that in the national insurance system. In most collective labour agreements, the 
supplementary benefits are for specific groups of workers, e.g. disabled workers, older workers or 
workers who are made redundant. 
 
While government and the social partners are responsible for the determination of unemployment 
insurance policy, other institutions are responsible for the implementation of this policy. First, the 
CWI is responsible for the registration of the unemployed and for the benefit intake procedure. No 
judgement, however, is given on entitlement to claims. CWI however, is responsible for avoiding (or 
reducing) the inflow into unemployment benefits, by encouraging a fast reintegration into the labour 
market. The CWI sends the intake report to the institution(s) responsible for the judgement and 
payment of benefit claims, either the UWV or the municipality. The UWV deals with claims for 
unemployment insurance (both national and sectoral insurance) and the municipality deals with 
claims for social assistance. The legitimacy of granted claims and the efficiency of the administration 
both by the CWI, UWV and municipalities is evaluated by the IWI and the minister of Social Affairs 
and Employment. The social partners historically had an important role in the social insurance 
administration, but since the beginning of the 1990s this role has been gradually reduced until the 
current role of the social partners’ which is being an important initiator/partner of collective 
bargaining and advising the administrative institutions.  
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Active labour market policy is a comprehensive term including a wide range of policies to enhance 
the employability of people. In the literature, five main categories are distinguished (Martin, 2000): 
(1) public employment services and administration, such as activities of job placement and benefit 
administration; (2) labour market training: spending on training programmes for both the 
unemployed (to increase their reintegration probabilities) and the employed (to keep them on the 
labour market); (3) subsidised employment, including hiring subsidies for employers who hire an 
unemployed worker and subsidies to the unemployed who want to set up their own business; (4) 
special youth measures to enhance young workers’ position on the labour market; and (5) special 
measures for the disabled to increase their employment probabilities. For this report, the focus is 
on reintegration of the unemployed.  
 
During the 1990s the emphasis in the Dutch active labour market policy changed from passive to 
active policies, i.e. from merely paying unemployment benefits to activating benefit recipients (Rutte, 
2003). To achieve this, the social expenditures on active labour market policy increased from one 
percent of Gross National Product (GDP) in 1990 to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2001. This is fully tax-
funded.  With the earlier mentioned SUWI law, ‘more market and less government’ is introduced 
with respect to the reintegration of the unemployed. Yet as Koning (2005) correctly argues, the 
national objectives on active labour market policy are rather vaguely determined: ‘towards a better 
working labour market”, yet this is not specified any further nor are standardised quantitative 
measures developed, apart from inflow and outflow rates into employment. Yet, common opinion is 
that active labour market policy should prevent the inflow into social insurance, increase the outflow 
out of social insurance benefits, not only instantly but also in the longer run and remove the unequal 
distribution of unemployment over different groups in society.  
 
In general, two main effects can be established by activation policy, a motivation effect and a 
qualification effect (Madsen, 2002). The motivation effect refers to the increased job search activities 
of an unemployed worker. The qualification or training effect refers to the fact that an unemployed 
worker who participated in a reintegration program has improved his skills and qualifications and 
hence better equipped to enter the labour market.  
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A number of instruments are open for the institutions responsible for the reintegration of the 
unemployed. Job mediation, by public authorities or by private companies, wage subsidies and 
training and education of the unemployed are all possible instruments. The type of reintegration 
support in the Netherlands depends on the ‘routing’ of an unemployed individual. With the new 
organisation of social security since 2002, the CWI, UWV and municipalities are held responsible for 
the reintegration of the unemployed. All unemployed workers start at the CWI branch and receive 
reintegration support. In case of entitlement to unemployment benefits, they are transferred to the 
UWV and in case of entitlement to social assistance benefits they are transferred to the 
municipalities.  
 
In this section information is provided on the different reintegration procedures of the institutions 
and the number of successes. Evaluation studies are still limited though, partly because the legislation 
is still new and partly, as de Koning (2006) argues, because the evaluation is largely left to the 
institutions themselves. They have been busy implementing the new administration strategies and 
left evaluation for the future. However, they might also be ‘afraid’ of bad results, leading to 
reduction of their budget or responsibilities (de Koning, 2006). Nevertheless, at this point in time a 
rather positive image is growing on the reintegration of the unemployed.  
 
4.2 REINTEGRATION OF THE UNEMPLOYED 
 
4.2.1 JOB MEDIATION BY THE CWI 
 
In the previous section on unemployment insurance it was already mentioned that the CWI is the 
first institution where job seekers turn to. The CWI is partly responsible (together with the other 
institutions in the chain of work and income) for avoiding and reducing unemployment benefit claims 
by encouraging a fast return to the labour market. As stated in its objectives the CWI task is  
“limited to basic reintegration, i.e. the job finding process of job seekers with a short distance to the 
labour market” (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2004). The emphasis is on job mediation rather than 
reintegration. During the intake interview, the CWI advisor evaluates the probability that the 
worker will find a job within six months. The CWI divides the job seekers in two groups (CWI, 
2005): (1) the A-group are job seekers who are ‘ready’ to look for work and the emphasis in this 
group is on finding a job, i.e. for whom the motivation effect is likely to be dominant; and (2) the B-
group are the job seekers who first need to be ‘prepared’  for the labour market, i.e. for whom the 
qualification is likely to be dominant. These people are unable to immediately start looking for a job 
due to personal problems (e.g., addictions, psychiatric problems) or physical limitations (e.g., 
disability). The emphasis in this group is on training and assessment after which a job match will be 
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sought.  Regardless, however, to which group the job seekers belongs to, “for every client, the right 
approach is used” (CWI, 2005; p.5). The CWI uses several instruments. For the A-group of job 
seekers, one of the main instruments in the job mediation process is the CWI work website. On 
this website the job seekers can place their profile and browse through available vacancies and 
employers can place their demand for labour or browse through the profiles of the registered 
unemployed. In 2005 72,584 vacancies were placed on the CWI website (which is about eight 
percent of new vacancies), of which about fourteen percent were matched with workers through 
the CWI. 336,717 worker profiles were available on this website (which is 89 percent of the inflow 
into unemployment insurance) of which on average 41,000 are emailed daily to employers looking 
for personnel. About 130,000 workers daily visit the website to look for a job (which is 34 percent 
of the inflow into unemployment insurance, CWI (2006b)). Apart from this direct job information, 
links to training and assessment are provided as is information on recent developments on the 
labour market. With the website the CWI wants to increase the labour market transparency and 
follow modern techniques of communication.  
 
By regularly (every three months) checking the status of the job seeker9, the CWI keeps track of 
the search efforts of the job seeker. In some cases, the CWI advises the job seeker to take part in 
training courses to enhance labour market skills (e.g., computer skills), yet, no budget is available at 
the CWI for this. The UWV might support such activities, provided that the training is of a short 
duration, that the trained skills are explicitly demanded on the regional labour market and that the 
training costs are below 2,000 euro (CWI, 2005). Due to differences in capacity, the supply of these 
activities differs between the CWI branches. In large branches less personal attention is paid to the 
job seeker, which is not conform the CWI objectives (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2004). In addition, 
the job mediation activities depend on the number of vacancies, i.e. when only a few vacancies are 
available, the possibilities for job mediation are limited. The CWI checks whether the job match 
between the job seeker and the employer is of good quality. Not only job seekers have to be 
satisfied, employers too. These are the input for the CWI and unsatisfied employers might decide 
not to go to CWI with new vacancies in the future (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2004). In 2005, the 
employers graded the CWI with a 7.0 for customer service, and the job seekers graded a little 
higher with a 7.3 (CWI, 2006b).  
 
As shown in Table 3.3 in the previous section, about one-fifth of the job seekers who report at the 
CWI find a job within eight days, the prevention quote (CWI, 2006b). In addition, the percentage of 
job seekers (A-group) on unemployment insurance who find a job within six months is 59.3, i.e. the 
motivational effect. As expected, it is lowest among older workers (33.4%) and still below average 
                                                  
9 In fact, the registration at the CWI is limited to three months, facilitating regular contacts between CWI and the unemployed 
worker. 
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for ethnic minorities (51.2%) and women (55.4%). The prevention quote and the outflow out of 
unemployment (into employment) within six months are the main performance indicators based on 
which the CWI is evaluated every year. Note that the extent to which these performance indicators 
are reached, also depends on the economic situation and the mobility at the labour market, an 
external factor which has to be dealt with by the CWI when developing new yearly objectives. 
 
4.2.2 REINTEGRATION BY THE UWV 
 
The B-group, but also the A-group clients who are unsuccessful in finding a job within six months, 
are transferred to the UWV, to the reintegration coach. This is an employee of the UWV who 
works at a CWI branch, thus formally the client falls under the responsibility of the UWV. This is to 
keep in close contact with both the contact person at the CWI and the individual himself. The 
reintegration coach evaluates the client (by using specially developed assessment tests to determine 
what kind of support the client benefits most from) and then supports him in finding a job by giving 
advice or by stimulating him to participate in training activities organised by the CWI. According to a 
recent research of the Inspection for Work and Income, by the end of October 2005 391 
reintegration coaches were employed at the UWV and in 2006 this increased to 450, which should 
enable the UWV to reach about 76,500 to 120,000 clients. In most cases, a reintegration coach has 
about 200 to 300 clients (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2004). Due to the short period of time that these 
coaches have been active (in some regions since 2004, on a national level since 2005), it is not 
possible to give quantitative evidence of the positive effects of the reintegration coaches. Yet, the 
opinion is that in individual cases the reintegration coach has a positive effect, mainly because of the 
short distance to the individual, the close contact with the CWI contact persons and the fast start of 
reintegration projects. To recover the costs of the reintegration coaches, every supported client 
should be reintegrated 3.7 days earlier than without the support. 
 
The UWV states that about eighty percent of its clients finds a job within nine months (Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2004).10 This probably includes the sixty percent mentioned by the CWI who find a 
job within six months, since most of these people are already benefit clients of the UWV. In case of 
a longer duration of unemployment (i.e. over nine months), the reintegration coach can decide to 
enrol the individual in an individual reintegration project of the UWV. European Union guidelines 
state that every benefit recipient should get an offer for a reintegration project within twelve 
months, the ‘Sluitende Aanpak’ (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2004). The actual reintegration activities are 
outsourced by the UWV. The UWV has contracts with private reintegration companies, at least 
two per region. Currently, over forty reintegration companies are contracted by the UWV (UWV, 
                                                  
10 This likely refers to all UWV clients, not only those on unemployment benefits.  
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2006b). The individual is able to choose between a number of these reintegration companies. The 
outsourcing of the UWV takes place by means of public tender, to ensure transparency of costs. 
The conditions for a contract are yearly determined by the UWV and online available (www.uwv.nl). 
Job seekers can also organize their own reintegration. The job seeker then signs an Individual 
Reintegration Contract (IRO) with the UWV and chooses his own reintegration company. The 
reintegration company, however, has to comply with the conditions of the UWV.  
 
Table 4.1 shows some evidence on the numbers of reintegration clients in different phases of the 
procedure. Unfortunately, these figures are for all UWV clients, including people on disability 
benefits, not only those on unemployment insurance. About one-fifth of the clients who are eligible 
for a reintegration program are not enrolled in such a process. In about half of these cases this is 
because the client (still) conducts his own search for a job (and is most likely to find one according 
to the reintegration coach) and in the other half this concerns clients who are not available for work 
due to sickness, personal problems or other reasons. In 36 to 40 percent of the cases the 
reintegration program is performed with the former (or current in case of partially jobless clients) 
employer. This merely concerns people on disability benefits. About one third of the clients is 
enrolled in a reintegration program.  
 
Table 4.1: Evidence on reintegration by the UWV, 2005-2006.  
  2005  First quarter 2006 
  Absolute  Relative  Absolute  Relative 
Clients to whom reintegration applies 
     No reintegration advice (yet) 
46,566 
  505 
100 





Reintegration advice made by labour market expert 
  No reintegration action 
    client conducts own search for work 
    client is not available for work 
    no reintegration possibilities for client 
  Not yet reintegration action 
  Reintegration via employer 
  Reintegration via private market 
46,061 
  8951 
    4339 
    4214 
    398 
  4,801 
  16,376 
  15,933 
100 
 19.4 
   9.4 
   9.1 
   0.9 



















Source: UWV (2006c, 2006d) 
 
One of the main performance indicators on which the UWV is evaluated is the percentage of job 
seekers who are reintegrated into the labour market. Using different evaluation studies, however, 
different outcomes are found. It is not always certain what kind of UWV clients are included in the 
numbers, e.g. are only unemployment benefit recipients included or do the numbers include all 
UWV clients, including those on sickness and disability benefits? For 2005 the UWV argues that 
about thirty percent of job seekers under their responsibility have returned to the labour market, 
regardless of a reintegration program (UWV, 2006d).11 With respect to the effectiveness of 
                                                  
11 This likely excludes the job finding rate of sixty percent reported by the CWI. After all, the UWV also reported that about 
eighty percent of the clients returns to the labour market within nine months. This could mean that about two-third of the 
clients enrolled in a reintegration program are reintegrated within nine months.  
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reintegration by the private companies, results over the first half year of 2006 show that for clients 
on individual reintegration contracts (about 35 percent of the unemployment benefits clients who 
started a reintegration program), i.e. the job seekers who choose their own reintegration company, 
about seventy percent has found of job (percentage taken of the total number of contracts that 
ended with the companies). For regular clients, who used the UWV list of reintegration companies 
to choose from, 37 percent has found a job (UWV, 2006d). One might argue that the first group is 
more motivated to find a job since they start their own reintegration program, and includes job 
seekers with the highest abilities (e.g., possible selection effect into reintegration trajectories), which 
explains the difference.  
 
The reintegration numbers differ between the reintegration companies. Table 4.2 shows the 
percentage of job seekers that are reintegrated through private reintegration companies, in this case 
information on the group of job seekers with unemployment benefits is available. The percentage 
varies from 9 to 34 percent. Note, however, that the reintegration programs are still running at this 
point in time.  
 
Table 4.2: Overview of the results of the reintegration companies 01-07-2004 to 30-06-2006 (intermediate results) 




Companies with >2,000 reintegration clients 
Agens de Werkende Kracht B.V. 
Alexander Calder Arbeidsintegratie B.V. 
Consolid Reintegratie B.V. 
Kliq B.V. 
Krew Reintegratie B.V. 
Randstad HR Solutions B.V. 

















Companies with 750 to 2,000 reintegration clients 
Argonaut B.V. 
Epheon Reintegratie B.V. 
IWA Arbeidsintegratie 
Lelie Hollander Reintegratie B.V. 
Serin B.V. 















Companies with < 750 reintegration clients 
Capability 
DHG Reintegratie B.V. 
Hudson Human Capital Solutions B.V. 
Idplein B.V. 
















Reintegration companies are also responsible for the reintegration of clients on disability benefits, which are omitted here.  
Source: www.uwv.nl 
 
To enhance the transparency of the reintegration market and to increase the competition between 
the reintegration companies, the UWV publishes so-called benchmark analyses on its website. The 
performance of all reintegration companies is recorded, yet only numbers on the effectiveness are 
54  Aias-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: The Netherlands 
available. No information is presented on customer service and customer satisfaction. To make the 
information as comparable as possible, several criteria are included on which a selection can be 
based: year in which the reintegration started, region in which the reintegration companies are 
working (the UWV contracts out by region) and the target group of clients (e.g., clients with a short 
distance to the labour market, with a long distance to the labour market, older clients, clients from 
an ethnic minority, or highly educated clients). The main outcome variables are the (actual and 
expected) percentage of reintegrated clients, the average duration of the reintegration program, and 
the percentage of clients who dropped out of the program. In this way, the UWV can directly 
monitor the effectiveness of the reintegration companies and they themselves can always see how 
competitive they are. Apart from the number of successfully reintegrated clients, the UWV is 
evaluated on the percentage of reintegration programs that start within four weeks, the so-called 
‘quick starts’. While the target for 2005 was eighty percent, only 42 percent of the programs started 
within four weeks. The main reason given by the UWV for this weak performance is that the 
reintegration coaches are not trained yet and that their number is insufficient to meet demand for 
reintegration counselling (UWV, 2006c).  
 
As for satisfaction of benefit recipients the numbers are not as positive as those for the CWI 
discussed earlier. Benefit recipients grade the customer service of the UWV with a 6.3, which has 
slightly decreased since 2003 (6.5). The dissatisfaction mainly concerns the payment of 
unemployment benefits, which is not always in time or the correct amount. The number of 
complaints has increased, yet about eighty percent of the complaints is handled within the legal six 
weeks, about sixty percent even within three weeks (UWV, 2006d). About sixteen percent of the 
complaints is unjustified, about sixty percent is justified. Complaints are mainly about information or 
communication to the clients (41 percent), payment of benefits (27 percent) or the duration of the 
judgement of benefit claims (15 percent).  
 
4.2.3 REINTEGRATION BY THE MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Reintegration for the unemployed on social assistance benefits is left to the municipal Social 
Services. They too are bound by the EU guideline stating that benefit recipients, including those on 
social assistance, have to be offered reintegration support within twelve months. The municipalities 
are free to choose how to support the unemployed in finding a job. Instruments commonly used are 
the reintegration by private companies, wage subsidies and training of the job seekers. Note that if 
the municipalities offer assistance to the individual, he is obliged to take this support. This might 
refer to an application training, a language or other course, vocational education, subsidised work, 
social activities or volunteer work. The individual who refuses such support or work can expect a 
cut in his social assistance benefits. 
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For the municipalities there is a financial incentive to successfully reintegrate job seekers into the 
labour market. When the targets, set by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, are reached, 
next year’s work budget (see Table 3.5 in the previous section) is increased, as kind of a reward. If 
the targets are not reached, the budget is cut. In 2002, 89 percent of the targets were reached 
(Peters & van Selm, 2004). The probability that a client is enrolled in a reintegration program after 
six months of unemployment is about fifteen percent, after twelve months it is slightly over twenty 
percent and after eighteen months it is about thirty percent (Groot et al., 2006).  
 
The reintegration probabilities not only differ by the duration of unemployment, but also between 
the municipalities. Table 4.3 shows the number of people on social assistance and the number of 
people in reintegration programs by municipality, only for municipalities with at least 100,000 
inhabitants. It can be seen that at least 38 percent of the social assistance recipients is enrolled in a 
reintegration program. Note that the percentage exceeds a 100 percent in some cases, which is due 
to the fact that a number of reintegration programs include people who are already employed (and 
therefore no longer receiving benefits) but who are still under the responsibility of the municipality 
(e.g., subsidised jobs). In addition, the percentage also includes some people who are receiving 
unemployment benefits but whom the UWV has transferred to the municipality.  
 
Statistics Netherlands recently analysed the effectiveness of reintegration programs of the 
municipalities (van den Berg & van Poeijer, 2006).  The research shows that in 2005, about thirty 
percent of the people aged between 23 and 57,5 who started receiving social assistance benefits, 
found a job within twelve months. Of this group, 30.4 percent received integration support from the 
municipalities and the others found a job without such support. Of the seventy percent of the 
people on social assistance benefits who did not find a job within twelve months, 44 percent did 
receive reintegration support.  56 percent of this group, which is about forty percent of the total 
inflow into social assistance benefits does not get reintegration support and does not find a job 
within twelve months. The research further shows that the outflow out of social assistance benefits 
is higher for men, for people with higher education levels and for natives. With respect to this latter, 
the lowest outflow percentages are found for people from non-western countries. 
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Table 4.3: The number of people on social assistance benefits and in reintegration programs, 2005. 
Municipality  Number of 
inhabitants 
Number of social 
assistance recipients 
Number of reintegration 
clients (abs) 
Number of reintegration 
clients (%) 
Municipalities with >200,00 inhabitants 
Amsterdam 743079  39570  19710  49.8 
Rotterdam 588697 39980  35830  89.6 
Den Haag  475627  21710  12030  55.4 
Utrecht 280949  9070  4230  46.6 
Eindhoven 209172 5880  7840  133.3 
Tilburg 200380  5150  5090  98.8 
Municipalities with 150,000 to 200,00 inhabitants 
Groningen 180729 9290  5150  55.4 
Almere 178466  4630  2600  56.2 
Breda 169709  4270 4040  94.6 
Nijmegen 159522  6960  4510  64.8 
Apeldoorn 156051 2550  2630  103.1 
Enschede 154377  5470  4420  80.8 
Municipalities with 100,00 to 150,000 inhabitants 
Haarlem 147015  3390  2750  81.1 
Arnhem 142195  6600    0.0 
 Zaanstad  140270  3000  1550  51.7 
Amersfoort 136999  2750  1620  58.9 
Haarlemmermeer 135136  1220  650  53.3 
Den Bosch  134717  3360  2440  72.6 
Maastricht 120175 3780  4620  122.2 
Dordrecht 118821 4090  2650  64.8 
Leiden 118069  3100  1900  61.3 
Zoetermeer 116979  2600  1000  38.5 
Zwolle 113678  2690  1360  50.6 
Emmen 108589  2610  2050  78.5 
Ede 107048  1600  610  38.1 
Source: CBS Statline 2006 
 
Another recent study of SEO Economic Research shows that the probability to find a job when 
enrolled in a reintegration program increases almost linear with the duration of enrolment (Groot 
et al., 2006). After six months of reintegration support, the job finding rate is slightly below ten 
percent, at twelve months it is fifteen percent and at eighteen months it is just over twenty percent. 
After this duration of reintegration support, the job finding rate increases less fast and at 36 months 
of reintegration support it is about 35 percent.  In coming years more evaluation studies are 
expected to be published, since the market of reintegration is now functioning for some years. The 
main difficulty, however, with the evaluation studies is that is not always clear what the reference 
group is. In addition, when comparing reintegration percentages between CWI, UWV and the 
municipalities it is not always clear how much overlap there is between these numbers. For 
example, a person receiving unemployment benefits for three months, is an UWV client since he 
receives benefits, but he is also a CWI client because he is still within the first six months of his 
unemployment. This might cause differences between evaluation studies and results should 
therefore be carefully compared.  
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The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) completed an interesting study on the 
economics of outsourcing reintegration activities to private companies (Koning & Onderstal, 2004). 
The authors state that outsourcing of reintegration activities is relatively new and an economic 
framework has not yet been specially developed for this. It is argued, however, that because the 
outsourcer is the same institution as the benefit distributor, the UWV, an economic cost benefit 
analysis is easy to make. The costs of the reintegration program have to be compared to the 
benefits of no longer paying unemployment benefits. The authors show that a cost efficient 
reintegration program meets three criteria; it is simple, efficient and effective. These conditions, 
however, do not necessarily comply with the objectives of the government. For example, one of the 
government’s objectives (or EU guidelines) is the earlier mentioned ‘sluitende aanpak’, i.e. the 
offering of a reintegration program within twelve months. This might not be cost efficient for some 
groups of unemployed workers for whom the costs of the reintegration program are higher than 
the costs of twelve months of unemployment benefits. In fact, the authors generalise this line of 
reasoning to adverse selection. Private companies who compete on prices of reintegration programs 
try to lower the price as much as possible. This usually implies that they can only select ‘easy’ 
clients, i.e. the ones who are relatively fast reintegrated into the labour market. The UWV remains 
stuck with the ‘non-easy’ clients, or the ones for whom reintegration might be too expensive. In 
fact, the authors argue, it might be even better for society as a whole, to not reintegrate these 
people, in case the costs of the reintegration are higher than the benefits of not paying them any 
social insurance benefits any longer. Outsourcing of reintegration in this case is not efficient, as long 
as competition is solely based on price. Durability of the employment relation after the reintegration 
program should be part of the competitive tools as well to reduce adverse selection.  
 
De Koning et al. (2004) focused on the effects of schooling on the reintegration of unemployed 
workers, i.e. to measure the qualification effect. Interesting results of this study are that the idea that 
the weaker groups among the unemployed, such as women, people from ethnic minorities, older 
workers and the low-skilled, are over-represented in schooling programs, is not supported by 
empirical studies. However, the positive effect –albeit very small- of schooling programs on the job 
finding rate is higher for these groups. Yet, the authors state that the empirical studies did not 
correct for selection bias due to differences in motivation, i.e. the most motivated clients are more 
likely to enter schooling programs. This could imply that the positive effect of schooling is 
overstated and given the fact that only a small effect is found, the net effect might be negligible. 
However, the studies do not take into account non-market effects of training, such as the increase 
in social capabilities and the usability of the workers. Because of schooling the usability of the 
unemployed workers might be maintained, thereby increasing the effective labour supply with 
positive effects on employment. In addition, the positive effect of schooling is significantly higher 
when the schooling is completed. One of the recommendations of the authors is therefore that 
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institutions should focus more on the completion of schooling and training courses and prevent 
people from dropping out due to other reasons than employment. 
 
4.3 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS SUMMARISED 
 
In this section, a brief summary is presented on the role and responsibilities of the main institutions 
involved in the reintegration of unemployed workers. Objectives as to the time span within which 
such workers should be enrolled in a reintegration program or have returned to the labour market, 
are set by the government and even the European Union (Employment guidelines). For example, the 
‘sluitende aanpak’ states that unemployed workers should be enrolled in a reintegration program 
within twelve months, when they have not returned to the labour market. The minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment is responsible for the monitoring of this objective, the administrative 
institutions are responsible for achieving the objectives. 
 
The first six months, regardless of what type of unemployment benefit the worker receives, the 
CWI is responsible for the reintegration into the labour market. The main instrument used by the 
CWI is job mediation electronically by means of a website and physically by means of a ‘exchange 
market’ at the CWI offices where the most recent vacancies are posted. After these six months, the 
job seeker is transferred to the institution that is responsible for the payment of the unemployment 
benefits. In case of unemployment insurance this is UWV and in case of social assistance this is the 
municipal Social Service.  
 
The UWV contracts out its reintegration activities, to private companies that meet the conditions 
set by the UWV. The UWV, however, remains responsible for meeting the objectives on 
reintegration. Individuals are either mandatory enrolled in a reintegration program and are then able 
to choose between a limited set of (regional) reintegration companies, or they are voluntary 
entered into an individual reintegration program and are then able to choose a reintegration 
company themselves. The municipal Social Services can also choose to contract out their 
reintegration activities, but they might also choose to leave the reintegration to the UWV or use 
other instruments such as subsidised jobs.  
 
The institutions are responsible for the evaluation of reintegration activities, but the IWI also 
evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of the reintegration programs of the institutions and 
reports to the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. As in the case of social insurance 
administration, the role of the social partners, and in particular that of the trade unions, in active 
labour market policies has also been reduced. With the existence of the trade associations, the 
social partners had an important role in the reintegration of disabled and unemployed workers. And 
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although one of the main criticism was the failing outflow out of these insurances into the labour 
market, the social partners were said to be given a role in the National Institute of Social Insurance 
(Lisv) partly because of their experience with reintegration activities (de Grave, 1996). 
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5 PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTCH LABOUR MARKET 
 
In this section, an overview is given of the performance of the Dutch labour market with special 
reference to the system of employment protection, unemployment insurance and active labour 
market policy as explained in the previous sections.  With the effects discussed here, as well as the 
evidence presented in the previous sections, not only do we give some conclusions for the Dutch 
social security system in general, but also the groundwork is laid for the international comparison of 
the role and responsibility of institutions in social security.  
 
5.1 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
5.1.1 GENERAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
 
The Dutch labour market is characterised as a relatively flexible labour market with good labour 
market performance, i.e. with relatively high levels of employment, perceived job security and job 
quality (Auer, 2005). Partly as a consequence of the activating employment policies in the last 
decades, employment rates are among the highest in Europe, both for men and women. Figure 5.1 
shows that employment rates for men are traditionally over seventy percent. From 1970 to 1985 
male employment have decreased as a consequence of the economic crises and the following 
recession in the Netherlands. After this period, male employment rates stabilised, while those of 
women have been increasing since then. Figure 5.2 shows some evidence on the inflow and outflow 
rates into the labour market (as a percentage of the labour force). Notwithstanding the cyclical 
effects on these rates, it can be seen that until 2003 the inflow rates for women are higher than 
those of men, while outflow rates are lower for women. This is due to the fact that government and 
social partners emphasised an equal treatment for men and women on the labour market, and 
because of the increasing possibilities for flexible working hours and child care arrangements as from 
this time (STAR, 2006). In addition, active labour market programmes were more and more 
targeted at the employability of women, also to increase their education levels. From 1960 to 2000 
the share of women in higher education has increased from 41 to 55 percent. Accordingly, the 
labour participation of higher educated women increased the fasted, with an increase of 5.4 
percentage points from 1996 to 2005 for women with higher vocational education and with 8.6 
percentage points for women with an academic education. The labour participation of lower 
educated women increased with about 4 percentage points from 1996 to 2005 (CBS Statline, 2006).    
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Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
 
Dutch unemployment rates are relatively low with currently an unemployment rate of about four 
percent (i.e. number of unemployed workers as a percentage of the labour force), as shown in 
Figure 5.3. Again the recession in the first half of the 1980s as well as the economic downturn 
halfway the 1990s are clearly visible. For the last ten years, the average unemployment rate for the 
EU (15 countries) has been shown and the Dutch rate is clearly below this European average, and 
following the same trend.  
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Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
As for flows between employment, unemployment and non-participation, the OSA trend reports on 
the supply of labour provide some information on this. As from the mid 1990s, the information on 
mobility flows on the labour market has increased, partly because of the availability of longer running 
data sets (Borghans, 1996). Table 5.1 shows that both employment and non-participation are 
relatively stable states, with staying percentages of eighty percent or higher. It can be seen, however, 
that non-participation has become less stable than in the beginning of the 1990s, mainly because of a 
higher number of transitions into employment (this group mainly consists of re-entering women and 
school leavers, OSA (2006)). For unemployed people, the most common transition is that into 
employment, with about half of the unemployed re-entering employment. About one-third remains 
unemployed (over a two year period) and about fifteen percent moves out of the labour market 
(e.g., discouraged workers or retirees).   
 
Table 5.1: Transition rates between employment, unemployment and non-participation, 1992-2004 
  1992-1994  1994-1996  1996-1998  1998-2000  2000-2002  2002-2004 




















































































Source : OSA (1999, 2002, 2004, 2006), Borghans (1996) 
 
As for the average job duration, it is often heard that the current Dutch labour market is 
characterised by less long-term relations between employers and workers (e.g., job hopping 
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behaviour of young workers),  yet both de Beer (2005b) and the OSA labour supply report show 
that this is not supported by empirical evidence. The average job duration of workers has increased 
in the early 1990s and since then remained about stable at a level of around nine years. The trend  
follows the economic business cycle. During times of economic uncertainty, workers are more likely 
to stick to their jobs and not take the risk of moving to another job (OSA, 2006). When only 
looking at the average job duration of permanent contracts, the trend is similar but the average 
duration is (naturally) higher at a level of about 10.5 years. In addition, the OSA study shows that 
the average job duration increases with age, as expected, with workers aged between 25 and 34 
having an average job duration of 5.3 years compared to an average job duration of 22 years for 
workers aged over 55. Moreover, the average job duration is negatively related to the worker’s 
education level. Worker’s with the lowest education level have an average job duration of twelve 
years compared to an average job duration of eight years for worker’s with an academic degree. 
The average job duration is highest in the government sector (13.5 years) and lowest in retail and 
commercial services (7.7 years).  
 
5.1.2 UNEMPLOYMENT IN MORE DETAIL 
 
In this section, some details are provided on unemployment rates for different groups on the labour 
market. The evidence is merely of a static nature, but in the next section on unemployment 
insurance more dynamic information (e.g. flows in and out of unemployment insurance) are 
provided. Figure 5.4 reveals that unemployment rates are slightly higher for women than for men, 
although this difference has been declining in recent years.12  In 1990 the male-female gap in the 
unemployment rate was 6.3 percentage points, whereas this has declined to 2.7 percentage points in 
2000 and further to 2.1 percentage points in 2005. As mentioned before, this is likely to be related 
to the increased emphasis on equal opportunities for men and women in the labour market, the 
higher education levels of women, the increased number of flexible work arrangements and 
increased facilities for child care.  
 
Table 5.2 shows unemployment rates by age and education level. Those aged between 15 and 24 
have the highest risk of unemployment. This is especially true for young people without any 
qualifications, i.e. they only finished primary education. 29.4 percent of these youngsters is 
unemployed. Yet, according to recent evidence of the CBS, the number of unemployed young 
workers is declining, and especially the number of unemployed young workers without a 
qualification (CBS, 2006a). It is generally true, and not only for young workers, that having no 
qualification produces the highest unemployment risk. Workers with higher vocational education 
                                                  
12 For this figure, evidence on ‘full’ unemployment is presented, not only registered unemployment as depicted in Figure 5.3. 
This explains the differences in unemployment levels.  
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(HBO level) have the lowest risk of unemployment, even lower than academics who are most likely 
competing for fewer jobs. For example, in 2003 there were 19,000 vacancies for 51,000 unemployed 
higher vocationally educated (i.e. 2.7 workers per vacancy), while there were only 4,300 vacancies 
for 32,000 unemployed academics (i.e. 7.4 workers per vacancy)(CBS Statline, 2006). 
 
Figure 5.4: Unemployment rates by sex (% of labour force), 1990-2005. 
Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
Table 5.2: Unemployment rates by age and education level (% of labour force), 1996-2006. 
  By age  By education level 
  15-24  25-44  45-64  Primary 
education 































































































Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
The difference between the other age groups is rather small, but when looking more closely we find 
the lowest unemployment risk of workers aged over 45. At first, this is rather unexpected since we 
know that older workers might be at risk of layoff because of their higher labour costs and because 
of the opportunity to retire early through this route. Because of reduced job search requirements, 
increased benefit durations for older workers and supplementary unemployment provisions from 
the employer, the unemployment route provided an alternative route for early retirement. 
However, the existence of generous early retirement opportunities in the 1990s prevented a high 
inflow in unemployment of older workers (Fouarge et al., 2004). As a result of recent policy changes 
in employment protection (e.g., the drop of the seniority principle as the leading dismissal principle 
in collective dismissals) in combination with the tightening of entitlement to disability insurance and 
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the closing of many early retirement routes, one of the main concerns is a future increase of the 
number of older workers in unemployment (CPB, 2006).  
 
As a measure of the demand for labour, the number of vacancies is used.  Figure 5.5 shows the 
number of existing vacancies, the number of created vacancies and the number of filled vacancies in 
recent years. The number of existing vacancies (measured at the end of each quarter) results in a 
sort of baseline or structural demand for labour. The figure nicely shows that the line representing 
the number of filled vacancies closely follows the one of created vacancies, representing a well-
functioning labour market.  
 
Figure 5.5: The number of existing, created and filled vacancies, 1998-2005. 
Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
Table 5.3 reveals more detailed information on the number of vacancies. Looking at the distribution 
of vacancies by education level, we find that the majority of vacancies (40 to 45 percent) are for the 
group of workers with a medium vocational education (MBO level). The number of vacancies for 
workers with a lower education level has decreased since 2000. This is likely due to higher 
education levels of the workforce in general and the improved technologies which increases the 
need for medium and higher educated workers. The number of vacancies in the academic field has 
been rather stable, which is mainly due to long tenure of people in higher academic positions (e.g., 
professors), reducing the mobility in these jobs (VAWO, 2006). In addition, most vacancies exist in 
the commercial service sector, which is in accordance with the growth of this sector in the 
economy. The number of vacancies in industry has decreased in past years which is likely related to 
outsourcing of activities to low-wage countries. The share of number of closed down companies in 
industry in the total number of closings has increased from 13.1 percent in 1998 to 14.3 percent in 
2004, whereas the share of closings in commercial services (the largest group) has declined from 
71.5 to 68.3 percent in the same period (CBS Statline, 2006). 
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Table 5.3: The number of vacancies by education level, sector and duration of vacancies, 2000-2004. 
  % of total number of vacancies 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
By  education  level       
Primary  education  5.51 7.92 4.60 1.97 n.a 
VMBO  28.6  29.52 30.23 22.76 n.a 
MBO  40.89 40.12 41.09 46.62 n.a 
HBO  19.14 19.46 18.85 23.37 n.a 
Academic  5.86 2.98 5.21 5.29 n.a 
           
By  sector       
Agriculture  1.53 1.58 1.04 1.35 2.29 
Industry  23.28 20.50 16.25 15.38 14.27 
Commercial  services  53.71 51.61 51.43 50.80 57.18 
Non-commercial  services  21.43 26.30 31.28 32.47 26.26 
           
By  duration         
<  1  month  20.07 20.91 22.85 29.52 24.34 
1-3  months  27.10 30.52 34.06 32.35 30.56 
>  3  months  52.84 48.56 43.09 38.13 45.11 
Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
Finally, it is interesting to look at the average duration of vacancies. In recent years the number of 
vacancies that is filled within one month has increased, from about one-fifth to about a quarter. Still, 
about half of the vacancies remain open for more than three months. This is expected to decrease 
in the future due to the outsourcing of reintegration activities to private companies that are, in part, 
evaluated on the speed of the reintegration. The involvement of the private market is expected to 
increase the efficiency on the labour market, and reduce the number of months a vacancy is open. 
 
5.2 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, INCOME AND COSTS 
 
5.2.1 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the number of new, ended and running number of unemployment benefits from 
1990 to 2006 as a percentage of the labour force. As a consequence of the economic downturn 
halfway the 1990s the number of entrants into unemployment insurance increased from three to 
almost six percent of the labour force. When corrected for the outflow out of unemployment 
insurance, this increase is more moderate, from two to about four percent of the labour force (i.e. 
the number of running unemployment benefits at the end of the year). In addition, although there 
was a new spike at the beginning of the current decade, again following the economic cycle, this 
spike is smaller than that of the early 1990s. This might be related to the changes in the benefit 
system, in particular to the increased entitlement conditions, the shorter duration of benefits and 
increased monitoring of job search behaviour by the UWV, but it might also reflect a less severe 
economic shock.  
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Source: UWV (2005, 2006c, 2006d) 
 
In addition, Figure 5.6 shows that about 0.7 percent of the labour force applies for an 
unemployment benefit but this application is rejected. The main reasons for rejection are not being 
unemployed (37% of reasons for rejection, e.g. still working some hours or not available for the 
labour market), job history is not long enough (21% of reasons for rejection) or that no benefit is 
granted because of a sanction (24% of reasons for rejection) (UWV, 2005).  
 
Figure 5.7 shows the inflow into and outflow out of unemployment benefits by sex. As noticed 
before, in recent years, the differences between men and women have become smaller. In 1990 60.4 
percent of the inflow into unemployment insurance was male, while in 2004 this share decreased 
slightly to 55.8, showing the larger share of women in the inflow into unemployment.  
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Inflow men Inflow women Outflow men Outflow women
 
Source: UWV (2005) 
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Figure 5.8 shows the composition of inflow into unemployment benefits by age. It can be seen that, 
probably partly in response to activation policies targeted at young workers, the share of young 
workers aged under 25 in the total inflow has decreased the most during the 1990s. The share of 
those aged over 35 has increased, in particular that of workers aged between 45 and 55, whose 
share has doubled from ten percent in 1990 to twenty percent in 2004. The share of workers aged 
over 55 has increased as from the late 1990s from five percent in 1997 to ten percent in 2004, 
probably because of the earlier mentioned abolishment of generous early retirement schemes (VUT).  
 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
aged 15-25 aged 25-35 Aged 35-45 Aged 45-55 Aged over 55
Source: UWV (2005) 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the amount of money that is yearly paid on unemployment insurance, as well as the  
average unemployment benefit per day. The same trend is seen as with the inflow into 
unemployment benefits, yet a difference is that the spike following the most recent economic 
downturn is now as high as that of the mid 1990s, which is probably due to inflationary reasons. The 
average daily benefit has been quite stable, only slightly increasing to follow the inflation, and is 
between forty to sixty euros a day.  
 
Table 5.4 shows some evidence on the amount of unemployment insurance by unemployment fund. 
As explained in section 3, the first six months of unemployment insurance are being paid from the 
sector fund and it can be seen that about a quarter to one-third of the total amount paid out of this 
fund. The majority of unemployment benefits is paid out of the general unemployment fund (Agf) 
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total paid benefits (mln euros, left axis) average daily benefit (euros, right axis)
Source: UWV (2005) 
 
Table 5.4: Unemployment insurance paid a year by unemployment insurance fund, 2000-2005. 
  Percentage paid from sectoral 
reduced pay fund (Wgf) 
Percentage paid from national 
unemployment fund (Agf) 
Percentage paid from smaller funds 

























Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
As for the average duration of unemployment benefits, according to the UWV, in 2004 about one-
fifth of the outflow was within nine weeks, half of the outflow was within six months and 75 percent 
was within one year. A quarter of the unemployment beneficiaries received an unemployment 
benefit for at least one year. Figure 5.10 shows the recent development of the outflow by duration 
of benefits. All curves, except those for benefit durations longer than two years follow the economic 
business cycle. The bottom curves representing duration longer than two years are likely to 
represent structural unemployment rates, which seem to be below 0.5 percent of the labour force. 
In general, people with a longer duration of benefits have a lower outflow rate, except for the 
‘short’ durations. It seems that most of the unemployment beneficiaries are people who are on 
benefits in between 9 to 26 weeks, although the difference with the group having a duration of less 
than nine weeks has decreased. Part of the explanation might be that in the period under 
consideration, the 1990s, many benefit recipients only receive a benefit of six months (e.g., short 
term benefit) and they either start searching more intense in the months before the benefits are to 
be exhausted or they move out of unemployment benefits into social assistance (Fouarge et al., 
2006). In addition, most application procedures might take longer than nine weeks to be completed. 
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
< 9 weeks 9 to 26 weeks 26 to 52 weeks
1 to 2 years 2 to 3 years > 3 years
Source: UWV (2005) 
 
Looking at the share of outflow into employment, which is shown in Figure 5.11, it can generally be 
concluded that a longer duration of benefits lowers the outflow into employment (i.e. discouraged 
worker effect). Although decreased since the beginning of the 1990s, on average about seventy 
percent of people who received benefits for less than nine weeks move into employment, which is 
about the same for people receiving benefits for less than half a year. In contrast, only about ten 
percent of people who received unemployment benefits for more than three years move into 
employment. Unemployment benefits are likely to be exhausted for this latter group of people, for 
which reason they move either into social assistance or into other income sources.  
 











1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
< 9 weeks 9-26 weeks 26-52 weeks 1-2 years 2-3 years > 3 years
 
Source: UWV (2005) 
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5.2.2 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS 
 
Figure 5.12 shows the number of social assistance benefits (as a percentage of the labour force) paid 
by duration of the benefit period. In contrast to the number of unemployment benefits, which had 
been increasing since 2000, the number of social assistance benefits has been rather stable over the 
past five years. About 3 to 3.5 percent of the labour force moves into social assistance every year.  
By far the majority of social assistance benefits, 75 to 80 percent,  has a duration of at least one 
year. A large number of social assistance recipients already have received the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits, (i.e. the long-term unemployed) and are most difficult to reintegrate. 
Another part of the group is made up of workers who did not meet the conditions for 
unemployment insurance, most likely because of a short employment history. These have less 
working experience and might be difficult to match with employers. In addition, the social assistanct 
group also includes those who are unable to work and living on social assistance ‘for life’. One might 
argue that the group of outsiders in the economy (i.e. the group of unemployed) can be divided into 
two groups: an A group that is least detached from the labour market and mainly concerns 
unemployment insurance recipients and a B group which is further detached from the labour market 
and mainly concerns social assistance recipients.  
 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
< 1 year > 1 year Unemployment benefits
Surce: CBS Statline (2006). 
 
Table 5.5 shows some characteristics of people on social assistance benefits and those on 
unemployment insurance. With respect to age, we find a higher percentage of young people in social 
assistance, compared to unemployment insurance. This is likely due to the fact that young people do 
not meet entitlement conditions for the latter insurance in terms of working years. When 
unemployed, they have to rely on social assistance. The higher percentage of older workers among 
the unemployment beneficiaries is also likely to include the hidden early retirement in the 
unemployment route (see among others Fouarge et al., 2006). With respect to the education level 
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of beneficiaries, an important finding is that the majority of social assistance recipients do not have 
any qualifications, most likely referring to the earlier mentioned B group of outsiders. Of people on 
unemployment insurance, the majority has a medium vocational education and therefore has a 
higher likelihood of finding employment again. In addition, most non-native inactive people are 
receiving social assistance benefits, especially those from non-western countries. These are again the 
B group of outsiders on the labour market, due to language barriers, education differences, cultural 
differences etcetera. Recently, active labour market programmes have been more targeted at ethnic 
minorities, especially on the young among these groups, to reintegrate them in the labour market 
and accordingly into society as a whole. Finally, about one-third of people on unemployment benefits 
has a job. This is most likely a job with less hours than before the unemployment, which still yields 
entitlement to unemployment benefits. Only thirteen percent of people on social assistance benefits 
have a job, which refer most likely to ‘try out’ jobs (e.g., subsidised) to find a good match for the 
future.  
 
Table 5.5: Characteristics of beneficiaries, by type of benefit, 2002. 
  People on social assistance 
(% of total population on SA) 
People on unemployment insurance 





























































Source: CBS Statline (2006). 
 
Outflow numbers out of social assistance are relatively low. In 2005 about 109,060 people moved 
out of social assistance (unfortunately, the destination is unknown), which is one-third of the social 
assistance recipients. Oei (2006) analysed whether the outflow out of social assistance differs 
between certain groups. The outflow to employment probability is highest for young people, about 
26 percent of the workers aged between 15 and 23 years move into employment, compared to only 
about eight percent of the workers aged between 23 and 57.5 and only one percent of workers 
aged over 57.5. This latter group is likely to move into retirement, as 34 percent of them moves out 
of social assistance without finding a job.  
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5.2.3 LABOUR COSTS  
 
As a consequence of the universal and extensive system of social insurance (i.e. the social 
democratic type of social insurance), labour costs in the Netherlands are relatively high. Table 5.6 
shows that about 75 percent of labour costs are related to wages, including supplements such as 
holiday allowance, public transportation cards etcetera. Just over one-fifth of the employer’s labour 
costs are paid for social contributions, with both unemployment insurance and severance pay for 
dismissals comprising 1.3 percent.  
 
Table 5.6: Structure of labour costs for employers, 2004. 
  Percentage of total labour costs 
Direct wage 
Wage supplements (e.g., holiday allowance) 
Wage for non-worked hours (e.g., paid leave) 
Wage in kind (e.g., business car or public transport card) 
Total wage costs 
 
Contribution disability benefits 
Contribution sickness benefits 
Contribution unemployment benefits 
Contribution pension funds 
Other social contributions 
Wage paid during sickness of worker 
Contribution in health costs worker 
Severance pay for dismissal 
Total social contributions 
 
Training and education costs 
Other costs 
Subsidies 
Total other costs 
 













































Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
Table 5.7 reveals that the structure of labour costs varies by sector. As explained in section 3, 
unemployment contributions partly depend on the risk of unemployment. In this way, costs are to a 
higher extent paid by those ‘responsible’ for the unemployment, or better they are more related to 
the firing behaviour of employers’. Contributions for unemployment insurance are lowest for 
companies in health care, government and education, all public sectors where employment 
protection is highest and unemployment probabilities are lowest. The contributions are highest in 
commercial services and agriculture, where unemployment probabilities are highest.. Looking at 
severance pay in case of dismissal, this is clearly highest in the government sector where the so-
called ‘gouden handdruk’ is famous for administrators at higher levels (e.g., mayors and central 
administrators). Severance pay is lowest in agriculture, retail, and in construction. For the first two 
sectors this might be explained by the fact that over the use of flexible contracts, i.e. without 
employment protection in terms of severance pay applying to it, is very common. The share of 
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flexible contracts in the total number of jobs is fourteen percent in agriculture and twelve in retail, 
both above the overall average of nine percent (i.e. over all sectors, CBS Statline 2006). For 
construction, however, this reasoning does not apply with the share of flexible jobs in the total 
number of jobs being below two percent, yet in this sector supplementary unemployment insurance 
is common (as the analysis of collective labour agreements showed), which might indicate that most 
dismissal cases in this sector go via CWI to secure entitlement to unemployment benefits. 
Unfortunately, no further evidence on this is found.  
 
Table 5.7: Structure of labour costs by sector, 2004. 









Agriculture  78.2 2.2 0.3  18.9  0.1 
Industry  76.1 1.3 0.6  20.6  1.3 
Public facilities  75.5 0.6 1.9  19.6  2.3 
Construction  76.8 2 0.3  18.9  2.1 
Retail  78.4 1.5 0.4  17.8  2.0 
Transport, storage and communication  76.6 1.5 0.9  19.3  1.8 
Financial services  73.5 0.6 1.5  21.1  3.4 
Other commercial services  78.4 2.4  1  16.1  2.1 
Government and social security  70.3 0.4 5.4  20.5  3.3 
Education  73.5 0.5 2.4  20  3.7 
Health care  77 0.3  0.4  19.6  2.8 
Cultural and recreational services  78 1.6  0.5  18  1.9 
Since the focus of this paper is on unemployment insurance, the other contributions which were specified in Table 5.6 are 
summarised into ‘other social contributions’.  
Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
As a consequence of higher contributions to unemployment insurance or higher levels of 
employment protection, wages might be lower (because the non-wage costs for the employer are 
higher). Looking at sectoral wages published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS Statline, 2006), however, 
no evidence is found for this. On the contrary, hourly wages seem to be highest in the government 
sector, education and financial services, all sectors with relatively strong employment protection 
legislation. Yet, the wages also reflect differences in human capital, which distort this picture. 
Unfortunately controlling for this is impossible with these data, yet in future it might be possible by 
using microeconomic data (e.g., Social Economic Panel Study).  
 
5.2.3 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE INCOME 
 
In this section we report some information on the income position of people on unemployment and 
social assistance benefits, compared to people on wages, to show the extent of the cleavage 
between insiders and outsiders. Incomes used are equivalised personal disposable incomes. 
Equivalised incomes are used to correct for differences in household composition and disposable 
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incomes are used to correct for subsidies and taxes that might affect the income of the individual. At 
this point the information is limited to averages on a macro economic level, in future research micro 
economic analyses will be performed on individual level replacement rates for people in 
unemployment, especially in an internationally comparative perspective. The unemployed in the 
Netherlands receive on average about sixty percent of what the active population receives. For 
people on unemployment benefits this is slightly over seventy percent while for people on social 
assistance this is about fifty percent (CBS Statline, 2006), showing the difference between the two 
groups of outsiders. In addition, for people on unemployment benefits, the unemployment income is 
about seventy percent of their total income while for people on social assistance this is almost 
ninety percent. The main reason for this, is that social assistance is means-tested on household 
income and unemployment insurance is not. Figure 5.13 shows some information on the relative 
income of the active and unemployed population. The active population earns about 55 percent of 
total income in the Netherlands, with a decline of one percentage point in recent years. This is 
mainly explained by the larger relative income of pensioners (CBS Statline 2006). The unemployed 
earn about two percent of total income in the Netherlands and their relative income has slightly 
increased in recent years.  
 
















Active population (left axis) Unemployed population (right axis)
 
Source: CBS Statline (2006) 
 
It is of interest to look at the so-called unemployment trap in the Netherlands. People on 
unemployment or social assistance benefits are commonly entitled to other social benefits as well, 
such as housing benefits or child subsidies. These subsidies are means-tested meaning that when 
their income increases because of employment, they might loose the entitlement to these benefits 
and even experience a less strong increase in income than in a situation without such benefits. It is 
often argued that this unemployment trap is one of the disturbing factors of Dutch labour market 
policy and discourages groups of people to find a job. A recent research of Statistics Netherlands to 
poverty in the Netherlands shows, among other things, that this unemployment trap influences the 
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job search intensity. 54 percent of the unemployed with only unemployment benefits searched more 
than eleven times within the last three months, compared to only 35 percent for the unemployed 
who had means-tested benefits as a supplement to their unemployment income. 23 percent of this 
latter group never applied for a job within the last three months, compared to nineteen percent in 
the former group (CBS, 2006b). It is difficult to quantify the unemployment trap, as there are 
different ways to interpret it, yet box 5.1 shows an illustrative example (Eurostat yearbook, 2004).   
 
Box 5.1: An illustrative of the unemployment trap 
A situation without means-tested supplementary income for the unemployed: 
Suppose an unemployed person receives 1152.33 euro gross unemployment benefits. The income tax paid on this 
amount is 24.14 euro and social contributions are 273.28 euro. This leaves the unemployed person with a net 
monthly income of 854.91 euro. 
When he would find a job, he would be able to earn 1645.98 euro gross a months. The income tax (progressive) 
paid on this amount is 57.29 euro and social contributions are 384.49. This leaves him with a net monthly income 
of 1204.20 euro. 
His income would increase with (1,204.20 - 854.91)/854.91 x 100 = 40.9 percent when he moves from 
unemployment to employment.  
 
A situation with means-tested supplementary income for the unemployed: 
Suppose the unemployed receives a housing benefit of 105.69 euro a month when unemployed, because of his low 
income position. This changes his net monthly income to (1152.33+105.69-24.14-273.28) = 960.60 euro. 
When he moves to employment, he loses this housing benefit and his net monthly income when employed is the 
same as in the previous situation. 
However, the increase in his income is now much smaller, (1204.20 -  960.60)/960.60 x 100 = 25.4 percent. 
 
Eurostat calculates the unemployment trap as follows:  
Unemployment trap = 100 x { 1- [(net income in work) – (net income out of work)] / (gross earnings)} 
           = 100 x { 1 – [ (1204.2) – (960.60) ] / (1645.98) } = 85.2%. 
 
Without the housing benefit, this would reduce to 78.8 percent, an unemployment trap resulting from the tax 
system and social contributions. In case of no taxes or social contributions the unemployment trap would be 70 
percent, due to the existence of unemployment benefits. Naturally, without unemployment benefits the 
unemployment trap would be zero. 
 
 
5.3 PUBLIC ATTITUDE 
 
In this section, some information is given on the public opinion on issues related to employment 
protection, unemployment insurance and active labour market policy, yet very briefly. First, results 
are taken from the European Value Studies 2005 provided by the EVS Foundation. In this survey, 
questions are asked, among others, on the opinion of respondents on work and the responsibility 
for social security. As for the importance of work, about half (47.5 percent) of Dutch respondents 
state that work is very important and almost all (86.5 percent) find work quite or very important. 
About 60 percent of the respondents agrees with the statement that work is a duty towards 
society. Only about 27 percent agrees that it is humiliating to receive a state income without 
working.  
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A more detailed research by Hoff (1998) measures the difference in the work ethic between 
workers and unemployed people. The respondents had to grade the statement “people who do not 
work, take advantage of society”, with a grade in between one (fully disagreeing) and five (fully 
agreeing). Currently, there is no large difference between the attitude of the workers, who graded a 
3.9 and the unemployed who graded a 3.6 (1995 figures). In 1982, however, the difference was large, 
with the workers grading a 4.6 (almost fully agreeing) and the unemployed grading a 3.7. One might 
concluded that the working population has become more accepting towards people on social 
insurance, perhaps partly because in the period in between the research moments, they have been 
dependent on social insurance themselves.  
 
In addition, in the study by Hoff (1998), the statement “social insurance is a right, we have 
contributed long enough” was also posed to the unemployed. In 1982 a higher percentage of the 
unemployed agreed with this (average grade 4.07), compared to 1995, when the average grade has 
dropped to 3.9. One of the main explanations given is that during the 1990s the emphasis in the 
welfare state has changed from a “right to entitlement of social insurance” to “a duty to move out of 
social insurance”, with the activating welfare state. Partly because of the increased activation 
measures, it has become less stigmatising to receive social insurance benefits. The average grade of 
the unemployed in 1982 was 3.5, which has declined to 3.1 in 1995 on the statement whether 
“people treat you differently when you receive a social insurance benefit”.  
 
As to whom should provide social security, the EVS survey shows that on a one (fully disagreeing) to 
ten (fully agreeing) scale, people were in the middle when it comes to the statement  “it is the 
government’s responsibility to provide people with a minimum income”. It is unknown how people 
think about whether it should be the responsibility of the trade unions to provide social security. 
About sixty percent of the people has confidence in the trade unions’ actions, while only about a 
quarter of the population is a trade union member. More research into the opinions of citizens on 
these issues is necessary.  
 
Another study, by Becker (2005), shows the opinion of people on the level of benefits. Figure 5.14 
shows the opinion of people on the level of social assistance and unemployment benefits in the past 
decades. First, at least since the second half of the 1980s more than half of the people find social 
assistance benefits too low. About twenty to thirty percent find unemployment benefits too low and 
about ten percent find them too high, the majority finds the level sufficient. Remarkable is that the 
same research shows that about forty percent of the people thinks that these benefits are misused 
(or abused), 36 percent with respect to social assistance and 45 percent with respect to 
unemployment benefits. This, however, does not leads to less support for the arrangements.   
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1980 1985 1991 1995 2000
Social assistance: too high Social assistance: too low
Unemployment benefits:paper: too high Unemployment benefits: too low
Source: Becker (2005) 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper an elaborate overview is presented of the Dutch system of employment protection, 
unemployment insurance and active labour market policy, with a particular focus on the institutions 
involved. In all three fields, national legislation is set by the national government. Dismissal 
procedural rules, notice periods, maximum trial periods, maximum duration and number of 
temporary contracts, entitlement conditions for unemployment insurance, level and duration of 
unemployment benefits, reintegration objectives, budgets for reintegration programs, those are all 
decided by the national government. The intermediary organisations, among which are the trade 
unions, only have an advisory role with respect to national legislation. By taking part in bipartite or 
tripartite council organisations they advise the government on the mentioned issues. The advice, 
however, is not binding.  
 
Nevertheless, in many fields Dutch national law is only ¾ legally binding, implying that deviations or 
supplements are allowed for at the sector level, in collective labour agreements. These are 
established by the trade unions and employers and as such these intermediary organisations have a 
say in legislation on employment protection, unemployment insurance and active labour market 
policy. With respect to unemployment insurance, legal provisions determine the minimum 
protection level for the workers and only supplements are allowed in collective labour agreements, 
i.e. the worker cannot be made worse off by sector provisions. In contrast, for employment 
protection, less strict provisions are allowed in the collective labour agreements. It depends on the 
collective bargaining power of the trade unions what kind of provisions are established in collective 
labour agreements. There might even be a trade off with supplementary unemployment insurance at 
the sector level or with wage increases.  
 
As for the administration of policies in these three fields (e.g., employment protection, 
unemployment insurance and active labour market policy, again mainly public institutions are found 
in the playing field in the Netherlands. Figure 6.1 shows an overview of the main institutions and 
their ‘position’ in the golden triangle discussed earlier. Though dominated by public institutions, 
most of them operate on an independent basis of the government, such as the Centre for Work and 
Income (CWI) and the Social Security Agency (UWV). On a local level we find a role for the 
municipalities, in the administration of social assistance benefits. As for more private or independent 
actors, the court has a growing role in the administration of employment protection policy and 
private reintegration companies have entered the field of active labour market policy. The trade 
unions not really play a role in the administration of social insurance, except in the case of collective 
dismissals where the trade unions establish the social plan and where they judge the conditions of 
the collective dismissal. In the past however, the trade unions did have a role in the administration 
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of social insurance, in the trade associations that were responsible for the administration of 
unemployment insurance and reintegration of the unemployed. With the reforms implemented 
during the nineties, their role has been drastically reduced. 
 
Figure 6.1: Summary of institutions involved in the administration of social insurance in the Netherlands. 
 
 
The Dutch labour market is characterised by relatively high levels of employment, job security, 
income security during unemployment spells and growing activation policies. Male employment rates 
are traditionally over seventy percent, while female employment rates have increased to over fifty 
percent in recent decades. Inflow into unemployment insurance is about three to four percent a 
year, as are outflow rates out of unemployment insurance. About half of the outflow out of 
unemployment insurance takes place within the first six months and about seventy percent of this 
group moves back into employment. Another twenty percent of the outflow out of unemployment 
insurance takes place after six months but within the first year of unemployment, yet less than half 
of this group (45%) moves into employment. About seven percent of the outflow only takes place 
after three years of unemployment and almost all of these people (over 90%) move into social 
assistance and can be considered to be fully dropped out of the labour market (e.g. over eighty 
percent of people on social assistance benefits remain social assistance beneficiaries for more than 
one year). Naturally, these labour market flows differ between groups on the labour market. Flows 
into unemployment are more concentrated among young workers (aged between 15 and 24), 
workers with the lowest qualifications (e.g. only primary school) and among women.  
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As for the costs of the system of employment protection, the evidence shows that about 75 percent 
of the employers’ labour costs are related to wages, just over one-fifth are paid for social 
contributions (including sickness and disability insurance). This differs among sectors, since part of 
the contributions to unemployment insurance depend on the sector unemployment rate. The 
unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits amounting to seventy percent of previous 
wages, which is relatively high compared to other European countries. Nevertheless, public opinion 
research shows that only about ten percent of the population finds this level of unemployment 
benefits too high, compared to about a quarter of the population who finds these benefits too low.  
 
Important questions that emerge from this country study are to what extent the labour market 
outcomes would be different when there is a different organisation of social insurance? Or better, 
when there is more involvement, for example, of the trade unions? Will lower employment 
protection lead to higher unemployment rates or will it increase mobility on the labour market (i.e. 
increasing flow into unemployment, but also flow back into employment)? Will lower unemployment 
benefits lead to shorter unemployment spells? What will such changes imply for the equality on the 
labour market? Will it increase the cleavage between insiders and outsiders? These and other 
questions are being answered in forthcoming papers within the research project ‘The distribution of 
responsibility of social security’. With this country study for the Netherlands and the other country 
studies for the United Kingdom (AIAS working paper no. 50), Denmark (AIAS working paper no. 
51), Germany (AIAS working paper no. 52) and Belgium (AIAS working paper no. 53), the input for 
such an international comparison is established.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AVV  Legal Extension collective agreements (Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring) 
CLA  Collective Agreement (Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst) 
CNV  National Federation of Christian Trade Unions (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond) 
CWI  Centre for Work and Income (Centrum voor Werk en Inkomen) 
FNV  Federation of Netherlands Trade Unions (Federatie Nederlandse Vakverenigingen) 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product (Bruto Binnenlands Product) 
IRO  Individual Reintegration Contract (Individuele Reintegratie Overeenkomst) 
LTO-Ned  Dutch Organisation for Agriculture and Horticulture (Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie) 
MKB-Ned  Association of Small and Medium-sized enterprises (Midden en KleinBedrijf Nederland) 
MHP  Federation of Managerial and Professional Staff Union (Midden- en Hoger Personeel) 
RWI    Council for Work and Income (Raad voor Werk in Inkomen) 
SER    Social and Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad) 
STAR    Foundation of Labour (Stichting van de Arbeid) 
SUWI  Structure Reorganisation Work and Income (Wet Structuur Uitvoeringsorganisatie 
Werk en Inkomen) 
UWV  Social Security Agency (Uitvoeringsinstituut WerknemersVerzekeringen) 
VNO-NCW  Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (Vereniging van Verbond 
Nederlandse Ondernemingen en Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond) 
WW  Unemployment Insurance Law (WerkloosheidsWet) 
ZBO  Independent Public Body (Zelfstandig BestuursOrgaan) 
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COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS 
Name  Duration of CLA  Number of employees 
Agriculture   
Agterberg  01/03/05 - 01/03/07  160 
Bedrijfsverzorgingsdiensten land en tuinbouw  01/07/04 –31/06/06  2,480 
Dierhouderij  01/04/05 - 30/06/07  3,591 
Glastuinbouw  01/07/05 – 30/06/07  47,570 
Hoveniersbedrijf   01/01/06 - 28/02/07  9,389 
Koppert  01/01/06 - 31/12/07  160 
Landbouwwerktuigen Exploitatie ondernemingen  01/01/05 - 31/03/07  19,264 
Rundveeverbetering  01/01/05 - 30/06/07  1061 
Tuinzaadbedrijven  01/04/06 - 01/04/07  3,300 
Varkensverbetering  01/01/05 - 30/06/07  250 
Weefselkweeksector  01/04/06 - 31/03/08  402 
    
Construction   
Bedrijfstakeigenregeling Bouwbedrijf  01/04/04 - 31/03/07  114,956 
BIK Bouwproducten B.V.  01/01/04 - 31/12/04  108 
Bitumineuze en Kunststof Dakdekkingsbedrijven  01/01/06 - 31/12/07  4,000 
Bouw en UTA  01/04/04 - 31/03/07  38,000 
Mortel en Morteltransportondernemingen  01/04/06 - 31/03/06  1,080 
    
Industry   
Acheson  01/01/06 - 01/04/07  135 
Akzo Nobel Pharma  01/06/04 - 31/03/07  6,048 
Bakkersbedrijf  26/03/06 - 31/05/07  26,541 
BASf Nederland   01/01/06 - 31/03/07  55 
Centraal Orgaan voor Kwaliteitsaangelegenheden in de Zuivel   01/04/06 - 31/03/07  165 
Crompton Europe  01/01/06 - 01/01/07  70 
Eternit  01/01/06 - 31/03/07  200 
Heineken  01/01/05 - 31/03/06  4,811 
Knauf Insulation  01/04/06 - 31/03/07  30 
Koffiebranderij en Theehandel "De Drie Mollen"  01/05/06 - 31/04/07  125 
Kollo Silicon Carbide  01/06/06 - 30/09/06  110 
Koninklijke "De Poreceleyne Fles"  01/07/06 - 01/07/07  70 
Kunstof en Rubberindustrie  01/11/05 - 31/05/07  5,000 
Lafarge Gips  01/04/06 - 31/03/07  91 
Mallinckrodt Baker  01/07/05 - 30/06/06  250 
Melkcontrolestations  01/07/06 - 30/06/07  92 
Mode, Interieur, Tapijt en Textiel  01/05/06 - 31/12/10  16,000 
Nederlandse Baksteenindustrie  01/01/06 - 31/03/07  1,350 
Nederlandse Gasunie  01/01/06 - 31/05/07  1,292 
Polimoon  01/04/06 - 31/03/07  130 
Recticel   01/06/06 - 31/12/06  350 
Rieter Automative Nederland  01/05/06 - 31/13/07  80 
SCA Hygiene Products Gennep  01/01/06 - 30/06/08  250 
Suikerunie en Cosun  01/01/06 - 01/03/07  2,900 
Suikerwerk en Chocolade  01/01/05 - 31/12/06  5,385 
Teepak  01/04/06 - 01/04/07  80 
Umicore Nederland  01/04/06 - 31/03/07  62 
Vredestein  01/01/06 - 30/06/07  1,225 
Winpac Netherlands  01/0706 - 31/03/07  69 
Zuivelindustrie  01/04/06 - 31/03/08  8,800 
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Retail   
Detailhandel Aardappelen, Groente en Fruit   01/04/05 - 01/04/06  6,416 
Ambulante Detailhandel  01/01/06 - 01/06/07  3,600 
Detailhandel Bloemen en planten  01/01/05 - 31/12/06  7,848 
Boekhandel  01/01/06 - 31/03/07  10,000 
Handel in Bouwmaterialen  01/04/05 - 01/07/06  8,780 
Drankindustrie en Groothandel in Dranken  01/01/05 - 31/12/06  4,999 
Groothandel in Eieren en Eiproducten  01/01/05 - 31/12/06  700 
Ikea Nederland  01/04/05 - 30/09/07  4,000 
Interpharm   01/01/05 -31/03/07  535 
Kantoorvakhandel  01/01/06 - 31/03/08  5,500 
Optiekbedrijven   01/01/06 - 31/12/06  6,500 
Praxisgroep  01/01/05 - 31/12/05  3,790 
Slijterijen  01/10/01 - 30/06/07  4,728 
Technische Groothandel  01/01/06 - 31/12/07  29,762 
Wonen  01/01/06 - 31/12/07  24,614 
    
Education   
Beroepsonderwijs en VolwassenEducatie  01/02/06 - 31/01/07  45,000 
CINOP  01/01/06 - 31/12/07  154 
Primair Onderwijs  01/08/06 - 31/07/08  181,000 
Ons Middelbaar Onderwijs  01/08/06 - 30/06/07  6,700 
Hoger Beroepsonderwijs  01/02/06 - 31/01/07  35,000 
    
Government   
Onderzoeksinstellingen 01/0/05  -  30/09/06  3,000 
Provincies  01/04/05 - 31/05/07  13,650 
Sociale Werkvoorziening  01/01/06 - 31/10/07  97,000 
Universiteiten  01/01/06 - 31/08/07  46,952 
Sociale VerzekeringsBank  01/01/06 - 31/03/08  3,578 
Rijksambtenaren  01/01/05 - 31/12/06  125,390 
Gemeenten  01/12/05 - 31/05/07  190,000 
 
SOCIAL PLANS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Company  Date 
ASML Netherlands B.V. 










Koninklijke Wegener  N.V. (KrantenBedrijven) 
UWV 
01/03/04 – 28/02/05 
28/02/04 – 01/07/05 
01/03/04 – 31/12/04 
15/03/03 – 15/03/04 
01/02/06 – 01/01/08 
2004 – 31/08/05 
29/11/04 - 31/12/05 
01/01/04 – 31/12/06 
01/04/05 – 31/12/06 
01/12/06 - 01/10/07 
11/03/05 – 01/03/06 
01/04/06 – 31/12/07 
25/05/05 – 31/05/08 
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